This is meant to be a way of describing/ discussing some of my photos and miscellaneous thoughts. Your comments and suggestions will be most appreciated. Either English or French are welcome.

Monday, January 29, 2007

Technological Answers to CAFE?

The following article (click on the post title to read all of it) lists several practical and less-practical ways of meeting increased CAFE requirements. The one thing it does not discuss is to how to change consumer behavior, other than differential vehicle pricing.

In fact, in this week's Automotive News there are many articles related to President Bush's comments last week in his State of the Union message. Although I hardly read every line of every article, I saw no mention of fuel taxation in any of them. The subject is simply ignored by what proports to be the most comprehensive newspaper in the automotive industry. Strange.


Bush's shocker: How to meet a higher CAFE


Richard Truett | |

Automotive News | 1:00 am, January 29, 2007


First the good news: In theory, automakers can meet President Bush's call to improve fuel economy simply by commercializing off-the-shelf technologies.

But it's going to cost plenty. If light-vehicle CAFE standards rise by a third by 2017, to 34 mpg, as President Bush proposed last week, we'll see a more small cars, diesels and hybrids.

Here are the technologies that could deliver big gains in fuel economy, along with ratings for practicality and cost. A score of 5 five means the technology could be on your driveway soon. A rating of 1 means the technology is the modern equivalent of the 100-mpg carburetor....




Best bets
How various fuel-saving technologies are likely to fare.
Winners: Turbochargers, diesels, starter generators, efficient transmissions
The jury is out: Lightweight materials, plug-in hybrids
Not in this lifetime: Fuel cells



          • Now that we've rated these technologies, we will offer a caveat on our grades. If Congress approves a steep increase in fuel economy, automakers inevitably will speed up introduction of these technologies.
          • One way to improve CAFE would be to manipulate the marketplace: Raise the price of big trucks and other gas hogs, then lower the price of smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicles. In the world of CAFE, this is a time-honored technique.

            So maybe we'll have to switch to pass-fail grades after all.

Saturday, January 27, 2007

A Point Very Well Taken

January 27, 2007, New York Times
Op-Ed Contributor

At Ease, Mr. President

Evanston, Ill.

WE hear constantly now about “our commander in chief.” The word has become a synonym for “president.” It is said that we “elect a commander in chief.” It is asked whether this or that candidate is “worthy to be our commander in chief.”

But the president is not our commander in chief. He certainly is not mine. I am not in the Army.

I first cringed at the misuse in 1973, during the “Saturday Night Massacre” (as it was called). President Richard Nixon, angered at the Watergate inquiry being conducted by the special prosecutor Archibald Cox, dispatched his chief of staff, Al Haig, to arrange for Mr. Cox’s firing. Mr. Haig told the attorney general, Elliot Richardson, to dismiss Mr. Cox. Mr. Richardson refused, and resigned. Then Mr. Haig told the second in line at the Justice Department, William Ruckelshaus, to fire Cox. Mr. Ruckelshaus refused, and accepted his dismissal. The third in line, Robert Bork, finally did the deed.

What struck me was what Mr. Haig told Mr. Ruckelshaus, “You know what it means when an order comes down from the commander in chief and a member of his team cannot execute it.” This was as great a constitutional faux pas as Mr. Haig’s later claim, when President Reagan was wounded, that “Constitutionally ... I’m in control.”

President Nixon was not Mr. Ruckelshaus’s commander in chief. The president is not the commander in chief of civilians. He is not even commander in chief of National Guard troops unless and until they are federalized. The Constitution is clear on this: “The president shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States.”

When Abraham Lincoln took actions based on military considerations, he gave himself the proper title, “commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.” That title is rarely — more like never — heard today. It is just “commander in chief,” or even “commander in chief of the United States.” This reflects the increasing militarization of our politics. The citizenry at large is now thought of as under military discipline. In wartime, it is true, people submit to the national leadership more than in peacetime. The executive branch takes actions in secret, unaccountable to the electorate, to hide its moves from the enemy and protect national secrets. Constitutional shortcuts are taken “for the duration.” But those impositions are removed when normal life returns.

But we have not seen normal life in 66 years. The wartime discipline imposed in 1941 has never been lifted, and “the duration” has become the norm. World War II melded into the cold war, with greater secrecy than ever — more classified information, tougher security clearances. And now the cold war has modulated into the war on terrorism.

There has never been an executive branch more fetishistic about secrecy than the Bush-Cheney one. The secrecy has been used to throw a veil over detentions, “renditions,” suspension of the Geneva Conventions and of habeas corpus, torture and warrantless wiretaps. We hear again the refrain so common in the other wars — If you knew what we know, you would see how justified all our actions are.

But we can never know what they know. We do not have sufficient clearance.

When Adm. William Crowe, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, criticized the gulf war under the first President Bush, Secretary of State James Baker said that the admiral was not qualified to speak on the matter since he no longer had the clearance to read classified reports. If he is not qualified, then no ordinary citizen is. We must simply trust our lords and obey the commander in chief.

The glorification of the president as a war leader is registered in numerous and substantial executive aggrandizements; but it is symbolized in other ways that, while small in themselves, dispose the citizenry to accept those aggrandizements. We are reminded, for instance, of the expanded commander in chief status every time a modern president gets off the White House helicopter and returns the salute of marines.

That is an innovation that was begun by Ronald Reagan. Dwight Eisenhower, a real general, knew that the salute is for the uniform, and as president he was not wearing one. An exchange of salutes was out of order. (George Bush came as close as he could to wearing a uniform while president when he landed on the telegenic aircraft carrier in an Air Force flight jacket).

We used to take pride in civilian leadership of the military under the Constitution, a principle that George Washington embraced when he avoided military symbols at Mount Vernon. We are not led — or were not in the past — by caudillos.

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s prescient last book, “Secrecy,” traced the ever-faster-growing secrecy of our government and said that it strikes at the very essence of democracy — accountability of representatives to the people. How can the people hold their representatives to account if they are denied knowledge of what they are doing? Wartime and war analogies are embraced because these justify the secrecy. The representative is accountable to citizens. Soldiers are accountable to their officer. The dynamics are different, and to blend them is to undermine the basic principles of our Constitution.

Garry Wills, a professor emeritus of history at Northwestern, is the author, most recently, of “What Paul Meant.”

Friday, January 26, 2007

What A Great Idea

Why didn't we think of this a long time ago?

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Detroit News Online


This is a printer friendly version of an article from The Detroit News
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January 26, 2007

Daniel Howes

Daniel Howes: One bonus plan for all employees is bold move

F ord Motor Co. and UAW leaders, in a revolutionary bid to put real money behind the "we're-on-the-same-team" slogan, are in discussions to create a single incentive plan to cover all U.S. Ford employees, according to three ranking sources close to the situation.

Likely to be presented to Ford's directors in March, the plan would pay each hourly worker "somewhere between $500 and $1,000" in advance of this summer's national contract talks and set common performance targets for all of Ford's 115,600 U.S. employees -- salaried and union.

If ratified, the plan would create an unprecedented model of mutual interest between the UAW and Detroit's automakers. It would mollify critics outraged that Ford is mulling whether to pay bonuses to salaried employees for hitting predetermined targets. And it would closely bind all employees to the company's competitiveness, striking a blow to the malignant us-vs.-them culture of Detroit.

It would be, in a word, brilliant.

How can talk of bonuses be justified when Ford on Thursday posted a $12.7 billion loss -- the largest in its 103-year history? The same way CEO Alan Mulally theoretically justified paying bonuses to salaried employees for 2006:

They helped achieve massive restructuring targets on cost-cutting, quality and customer satisfaction, the precursors to delivering profits and expanding market share. Without the hard work of all Ford folks, from Glass House offices and engineering cubicles to the factory floor, the Blue Oval is toast.

It's all about "inclusion," Mulally told The Detroit News, referring to his notion of team-building. "It's about everybody knowing the business realities, everybody knowing what our plan is to deal with it. The most important thing to our employees is that we're compensating them competitively -- our executives, our management, all of our employees."

And, it should be added, compensating them fairly. That Ford would be considering bonuses for salaried employees when union members approved health care concessions for retirees, saving Ford close to $1 billion annually; or when most of its locals approved "competitive operating agreements"; or when 38,000 hourly workers accepted buyouts -- all of them saving Ford big dough -- strikes many as unfair.

Treating all the same

"Our current agreement does not give" union members "a penny," one source familiar with the talks told me, because the United Auto Workers' profit-sharing plan pays out only when Ford books profits from its U.S. operations. "It feeds divisiveness. You take away all that stuff. You have one Ford team working for the same objective. If you're in the money, you all benefit."

The logic behind the plan, similar to ones used at Boeing and Xerox, is that union and salaried employees would benefit if the company achieves incremental improvements of 15 percent or more annually on predetermined targets. Those include cost, cash flow, quality and customer satisfaction, as well as profitability and market share.

Ford and UAW officials declined comment.

If agreed to by both sides in a memorandum of understanding, pending ratification in this year's contract, the deal likely would pressure General Motors Corp. and the Chrysler Group to follow suit. Currently, Ford has five separate incentive/bonus plans, Chrysler has four and GM has three.

"If they eliminated the bonus pool and said we're using the same bonus formula for everybody, that would be a sea change in Detroit," said Sean McAlinden, chief economist at the Center for Automotive Research. "It's a big fairness issue. Let's recognize productivity change, flexibility -- the whole shot -- not just profits."

Ford's 'better idea'

It would be hard to overstate how revolutionary a change like this would be. Union and salaried folks would share incentives to achieve the same goals and would be rewarded for hitting or exceeding them -- a reflection of Mulally's intent that everyone be on the same page.

In Ford's often petty culture, salaried employees might grumble that union members are being rewarded for their innovative engineering, design or purchasing decisions. There might be concerns among the rank and file that jettisoning the traditional union profit-sharing plan for a single unified incentive plan might shortchange them.

But how? By its own admission, Ford will not be profitable in the United States until 2009, meaning UAW members are likely to go half a decade or more without seeing any profit sharing.

Under the plan being discussed by Ford and the UAW, members would see a modest payout this year for last year's progress and likely additional payouts in the next few years -- money they would never see under their profit-sharing plan.

"You're not going to be getting the same payout," one source said, "but you'll be working towards the same metrics."

Yes, the CEO would reap a bigger reward than a 10-year veteran of the assembly line. But they'd both be reaping a reward according to the same criteria.

'Equal sacrifice, equal gain'

If nothing else, Ford's year-end earnings and the outlook for this year and next, detailed Thursday, show how difficult the automaker's road back is likely to be. The brutal truth is, there are no guarantees Mulally & Co. will succeed.

They have too much plant capacity and too many people. Too much of their business model rests on slow-selling SUVs and pickups and not enough on fuel-efficient cars, crossovers and gas-electric hybrids. And brands like Jaguar Cars continue to consume cash and deliver losses.

But Mulally has told associates he regards a unified incentive plan as a potential game-changer, a rallying point that "makes so much sense" and could help Ford emerge from its funk sooner.

Pursuing the deal in advance of this summer's bargaining with the UAW gives UAW President Ron Gettelfinger and Vice President Bob King some help in selling an agreement likely to offer slim pay raises, if any, and changes to health-care benefits.

"Perceived fairness costs a great deal of votes on any contract," McAlinden said. "Equal sacrifice is something that's printed above every work station at Ford. You've got to give the equal sacrifice -- or equal gain."

Thursday, January 25, 2007

Gasoline: Price Matters

The following is an exerpt of an interesting article from the LA Times. To read all of it, click on the post title above.

To read a summary of the Cambridge Energy Research Associates report cited in the article, go to:

http://www2.cera.com/gasoline/summary/

All in all, this confirms my conviction that higher gasoline taxes will significantly change consumer behavior.

U.S. motorists cutting back a bit

Americans cut miles driven for the first time since 1980. High prices are behind the change in transportation habits.
By Elizabeth Douglass
Los Angeles Times Staff Writer

January 25, 2007

Two years of record-high gasoline prices have forced auto-crazed Americans to do something they haven't done in more than two decades: Drive less. ...


Other reports over the last year on mass transit ridership, total miles driven nationwide, gasoline demand, vehicle sales and retail and restaurant spending reinforce the notion that U.S. drivers made significant — and in some cases, lasting — adjustments to offset steadily rising gasoline prices.

"In 2005 and into 2006, we did see consumers start to change their driving behavior," said David Portalatin, director of industry analysis at NPD Group Inc., which tracks consumer spending. "That's a very hard thing to change, because I've either got to change where I work, where I live, or what kind of car I drive in order to actually consume less gasoline."

It's a small but important shift for a nation that many believed was impervious to rising gas prices because drivers were unable or unwilling to rein in their gas-guzzling ways. Lofty energy costs have generated such concern that President Bush devoted a significant chunk of his last two State of the Union speeches to addressing the nation's oil addiction.

"The message is that price matters," said Daniel Yergin, chairman of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, a Boston-area consulting company that recently published an analysis called "Gasoline and the American People." The study highlighted the decline in per-driver mileage and a cooling appetite for the largest sport utility vehicles, among other things, and concluded that expensive gasoline was transforming "America's love affair with the automobile."

Even though pump prices have dropped substantially from their highs in 2006, "there's a greater sense of insecurity, and people don't want to be caught emptying their wallet at the gasoline pump," said Yergin, author of "The Prize," a Pulitzer-winning history of the oil industry....

While high prices cut into the expected growth rate, U.S. gasoline consumption nonetheless increased by about 1% in 2006 after staying flat the previous year. "The gasoline consumed since that August peak in gasoline prices is up nearly 2.5% versus the comparable time period a year ago," said Portalatin, the NPD researcher. "What it means is that consumers have a short memory."

Retiree Joe McElroy of Fountain Valley admits to being a backslider. When local gas costs jumped last summer, McElroy consolidated errands and trimmed trips to visit Riverside relatives. But, he acknowledged, "when prices eased up, I kind of relaxed on that cutback and went ahead and did a little more driving."

That response is what economists have come to expect. Decades of studies invariably conclude that big spikes in prices at the pumps produce only tiny short-term cutbacks in demand. If that research is any guide, whatever changes motorists made during the recent gas-price spikes would be wiped out by recently plunging prices outside of California.

But some transportation experts say that a handful of new factors are starting to turn the tide, causing some consumption changes to stick despite lower prices....

Wednesday, January 24, 2007

Energy and the State of the Union

One of President's Bush's major themes in last night's State of the Union message was energy independence, wherein he proposed some "painless for the electorate" initiatives. I was disappointed, but not at all surprized, that there was no mention of changing consumer behavior in significant ways, such as by increasing fuel taxes. Biofuels are, as the following column says, may be good ideas but will not significantly impact energy independence in the foreseeable future. Playing around with CAFE will not probably have much real impact (other that causing the auto industry problems) if consumers have no economic reason to choose smaller, lighter vehicles and drive less and more slowly.

Nor was it surprising that President Bush had nothing to say about stationary sources of CO2. Apparently, he still doesn't believe in global warming.



Blindness on Biofuels

By Robert J. Samuelson
Wednesday, January 24, 2007; A23, Washington Post

President Bush joined the biofuels enthusiasm in his State of the Union address, and no one can doubt the powerful allure. Farmers, scientists and venture capitalists will liberate us from insecure foreign oil by converting corn, prairie grass and much more into gasoline substitutes. Biofuels will even curb greenhouse gases. Already, production of ethanol from corn has surged from 1.6 billion gallons in 2000 to 5 billion in 2006. Bush set an interim target of 35 billion gallons in 2017 on the way to the administration's ultimate goal of 60 billion in 2030. Sounds great, but be wary. It may be a mirage.

The great danger of the biofuels craze is that it will divert us from stronger steps to limit dependence on foreign oil: higher fuel taxes to prod Americans to buy more gasoline-efficient vehicles and tougher federal fuel economy standards to force auto companies to produce them. True, Bush supports tougher -- but unspecified -- fuel economy standards. But the implied increase above today's 27.5 miles per gallon for cars is modest, because the administration expects gasoline savings from biofuels to be triple those from higher fuel economy standards.

The politics are simple enough. Americans dislike high fuel prices; auto companies dislike tougher fuel economy standards. By contrast, everyone seems to win with biofuels: farmers, consumers, capitalists. American technology triumphs. Biofuels create rural jobs and drain money from foreign oil producers. What's not to like? Unfortunately, this enticing vision is dramatically overdrawn....

To read the rest of this column, go to:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/23/AR2007012301562.html


Dan Howes of the Detroit News has some interesting reactions to President Bush's energy declarations in last night's State of the Union Message. To see them, go to:

http://www.detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070124/AUTO02/701240347/1148

To see the New York Times article of this part of the speech, go to:

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/24/washington/24energy.html?_r=1&oref=slogin

The Wall Street Journal take on the subject:

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116957395027385156.html?mod=hps_us_pageone



Following are summaries of the President's energy proposals:

From the Detroit Free Press:

http://www.freep.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070124/BUSINESS01/701240403/1002/


"Here are some details of President George W. Bush's 20 in 10 proposal. To reduce U.S. gasoline consumption by 20% by 2017, Bush wants to:

• Increase requirements for renewable fuels to 35 billion gallons a year by 2017. The current targets call for 7.5 billion gallons by 2012. This increase would account for a 15% reduction in gasoline use.

• Increase fuel economy by about 4% a year, starting with the 2010 model year for cars and 2012 for trucks. This would save up to 8.5 billion gallons of gas a year, the additional 5% reduction toward the goal.

If met, the moves would reduce U.S. gas consumption in 2017 to below today's levels and halt the increase in global warming gases from vehicles."

From the Detroit News:

http://www.detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070124/POLITICS/701240421/1148/

"Autos/energy
  • Slash gasoline consumption by up to 20 percent by 2017, primarily by increasing the amount of ethanol and other alternative fuels the federal government mandates must be produced.
  • Give federal officials authority to raise auto fuel mileage standards, allowing automakers to trade or "bank" credits among models.
  • Double the capacity of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve -- a protection against emergency oil market disruptions caused by terrorism or natural disaster -- to 1.5 billion and fill it by 2027."
  • Tuesday, January 23, 2007

    American Islam

    A fascinating dialogue. I have bought "American Islam" and will probably report on it when I finish reading it. Don't hold your breath: I am way behind in my reading.





    the book club
    American Islam
    Why Americans fear Muslims.
    By Reza Aslan and Daniel Benjamin, Slate Magazine
    Updated Tuesday, Jan. 23, 2007, at 2:05 PM ET




    From: Daniel Benjamin
    To: Reza Aslan
    Subject: Will Islamic Radicalism Gain a Foothold in America?

    Posted Tuesday, Jan. 23, 2007, at 10:35 AM ET
    Reza—

    One of the striking things about mainstream journalism in post-9/11 America has been the scant attention paid to the nation's Muslim community. There were, of course, plenty of stories on the many immigrants taken into detention after the terrorist attacks and on the questioning of large numbers of Muslims by law enforcement officials. But compared with the enormous amount of copy that newspapers devoted to the pederast priest scandals, the coverage of American Muslims has been seriously inadequate. Given the size and importance of the community—it's no understatement to say that it is the first line of defense against jihadist attack—the lack of reporting has been a dramatic failing of the American media.

    There were a few exceptions, and one was a series of Page One stories that Paul M. Barrett wrote for the Wall Street Journal in 2003. Those articles provided the basis for American Islam: The Struggle for the Soul of a Religion, a book that fills a real need and does so remarkably well. (Full disclosure: Paul Barrett is an old friend and former colleague.) American Islam does not give us the entire picture of what is going on among believers of the nation's fastest-growing religion. Nothing could. But through a group of seven profiles, it delivers a set of powerful insights about Muslim life in the United States and the tensions that are shaping the community—or, more accurately, communities, since there is a fractious diversity of Muslims in the United States.

    As you might imagine, American Islam is a study of people caught in the crosscurrents. Some are trying to navigate between the roles of dexterous insider and outraged outsider. Others are trying to push their fellow Muslims to adopt changes that are at odds with hundreds of years of tradition. Others still are re-litigating ancient struggles—such as between mysticism and orthodoxy—in a New World setting. Several are trying to champion a tolerant, ecumenical version of Islam against one that seems increasingly insular and xenophobic.

    In that sense, the book poses the question that really is the central one not only for Muslims but all Americans: Is radicalism going to gain a real foothold here?

    Barrett's carefully crafted approach is a smart one because of the paucity of sociological data on Islam in the United States. We don't even know how many Muslims there are in the country; the Census Bureau doesn't ask about religious affiliation. Estimates by Muslim groups put the number at 6 million or higher, but these are truly rough guesses; as Barrett notes, the best guess is between 3 and 6 million. The number of mosques is also a matter of dispute, as is the degree of religious observance within communities. Trying to get a sense of the relative strength of different strains of thought among American Muslims is maddeningly difficult.

    So, instead of giving us unsubstantiated generalizations, Barrett looks closely at the micro-environments of his seven subjects. Among them are a colorful newspaper publisher of Lebanese Shiite origins who is a power broker in Michigan's large and politically influential Muslim community, and noted Kuwaiti-born scholar Khaled Abou el Fadl, who challenged fellow Muslims to speak out against the attacks of 9/11, becoming something of a pariah. A chapter on Siraj Wahhaj, a radical-leaning imam in Brooklyn, traces the complicated story of African-American Islam, whose adherents compose a fifth of the country's Muslim population but who have tense relations with Muslims of foreign ancestry, as well as attachments to figures such as Malcolm X and Louis Farrakhan that are shared by no other Muslims.

    In telling these stories, Barrett exercises great restraint, avoiding the temptation to generalize on the basis of individual experiences. The book—which I thought was a great read—does not overinterpret, letting the reader instead, for example, hear the unadorned story of Abdul Kabir Krambo, an American-born hippie-turned-Sufi whose faith gave him an anchor in life but not quite enough equanimity to deal with the foreign-born Muslims (he was " 'the token white guy' " on the board of his mosque) who don't always approve of his native ways. Krambo's mosque was destroyed by arson in 1994. The mystery of whether the attack was carried out by non-Muslim Americans or anti-Sufi Muslims provides a perfect example of the complex tensions that plague Barrett's characters.

    Among scholars of terrorism these days, the accepted wisdom is that a major reason no second catastrophic attack on the United States has occurred is that the foot soldiers of jihad are not here—at least not in great numbers. Many Muslims in this country may be angry about U.S. foreign policy, but they are not alienated from American society or values. They are also more educated than the national norm, earn more than the norm, and are not ghettoized, as the Muslims of Europe are. ("American Muslims have bought into the American dream," my friend Marc Sageman, the author of Understanding Terror Networks, likes to say. "What is the European dream?")

    But will it stay that way? One of the most moving chapters hints that it will. "The Activist" describes the trajectory of Mustafa Saied, an Indian-born Muslim who gravitates to the Muslim Brotherhood while in college and spends his time at rallies where the chant was "Idhbaahal Yahood" ("Slaughter the Jews"). He later renounces his extremism after intense conversation with other Muslims, one of whom persuades him that " 'the basic foundations of American values are very Islamic—freedom of religion, freedom of speech, toleration.' "

    However, that there are some extremists afoot is clear from a chapter on Sami Omar al-Hussayen, the Saudi graduate student at the University of Idaho who was unsuccessfully prosecuted under the Patriot Act for giving material support to terrorists through his role as a Web master for a legal student group. The members of al-Hussayen's Islamic Assembly of North America are, at the very least, addicted to some deeply anti-American rhetoric, such as the writings of the "Awakening Sheikhs" of Saudi Arabia, Safar al-Hawali and Salman bin Fahd al-Awda.

    I'm persuaded that America's culture of immigration has made a huge difference in shaping the attitudes of Muslims here. But other elements in the culture—rising Islamophobia, especially from the Christian right, and ham-handed law enforcement efforts, of the kind Barrett explores in his chapter on al-Hussayen—appear to be eroding some Muslims' sense of belonging. And, of course, there is our presence in Iraq, which appalls most American Muslims, including the Iraqi expats who once supported the invasion. Which way do you think the wind is blowing?

    I'd also like your thoughts on one of the central themes of the book—that Islam, or at least one stream of it, is being remade by its encounter with America. This notion appears in several of Barrett's chapters, including the one on Asra Nomani, the former Journal reporter, single mother, and author of Standing Alone in Mecca, who confronted her hometown mosque in West Virginia with a determined campaign for equal treatment for women. In your superb book No god but God, you discuss the "Islamic Reformation" and mention, for example, European thinker Tariq Ramadan's contention that the synthesis of Islam and Western democratic ideals is driving the faith in that direction. Does Barrett's reportage suggest something similar is happening in the United States?

    In any case, the changes that Barrett describes are encouraging. But as I think he would agree, it is impossible to say whether the stories he relates are indicative or isolated. What's your take?

    Bests,
    Dan




    From: Reza Aslan
    To: Daniel Benjamin
    Subject: Assimilation and the Creation of a Uniquely American Faith

    Posted Tuesday, Jan. 23, 2007, at 2:05 PM ET

    Dan,

    As I was reading American Islam, I was reminded of an incident that occurred last November in Washington, D.C., and got a lot of play in the American Muslim community. Jerry Klein, a popular radio host at WMAL-AM 630, suggested during one of his shows that Muslims in the United States should be forced to wear "identifying markers," specifically "a crescent moon arm band, or … a crescent moon tattoo." As one would expect, his phone lines were immediately jammed with listeners. Only they were not calling to excoriate Klein, but to agree wholeheartedly with him. One caller argued that American Muslims should not only be tattooed "in the middle of their foreheads," but that they should then be "rounded up and shipped out of the country." A Maryland caller concurred. "You have to set up encampments like they did during World War II," he said, "like with the Japanese and Germans."

    Of course, what the callers did not realize was that Klein was joking. To his credit, he was horrified by his listeners' reactions, and said so on air. But perhaps Klein should not have been so surprised. According to recent polls, 39 percent of Americans want Muslims living in the United States to carry "special identification," and nearly half think their civil liberties should be curtailed in the name of national security. Roughly a third of those polled are convinced that the sympathies of America's Muslim community lies with al-Qaida, while a full 60 percent say they do not know any Muslims.

    As a Muslim, I am obviously disturbed by these figures. But what I find particularly remarkable about these polls is that if the person being polled actually knows a Muslim, they are less likely to have negative perceptions of Islam. (By the way, I think that Barrett's estimate of how many Muslims currently live in America is low; more realistic, I suspect, are estimates of 6 million to 10 million.) It follows, then, that the best way to educate Americans about Islam is to introduce them to living, breathing American Muslims. That is precisely what makes Barrett's book such an engaging and important read. To my mind, this intimate group portrait of American Muslims is far more revealing than any of the half-dozen or so academic tomes that have been written on the subject over the last few years.

    You are right to point out that the American Muslim community has, for the most part, managed to avoid many of the problems of identity and integration that plague Muslim communities in Europe. Barrett, like many social scientists, argues that this is partly due to economic factors. After all, the majority of European Muslims come from impoverished immigrant families, while the majority of Muslims in the United States are either middle-class converts or educated immigrants. Sixty percent of Muslims in the United States own their own homes. Believe it or not, the median income for a Muslim household in America is greater than it is for a non-Muslim household.

    But as I read the individual profiles in American Islam, it became clear to me that it is more than mere economic factors that have allowed Muslims to so thoroughly assimilate into American society. (By the way, maybe it is this assimilation that explains why so many Americans think they have never met a Muslim. Perhaps they assume all look and dress like Osama bin Laden.)

    Although Barrett does not press the point, I truly believe the ease with which Muslims have assimilated into American culture has less to do with economics than it does with America's long and storied history of assimilating different cultures and ethnicities under a single shared political and cultural ideal—an ideal we can label simply as Americanism. The Muslims who settled in Europe formed insulated ethnic enclaves cut off from the rest of European society. But American Muslims have seamlessly integrated into almost every level of American society. Indeed, they represent the most powerful argument against the prevailing "Clash of Civilizations" mentality that pits Islam against the West.

    Finally, as a Muslim who lives in the United States and who has spent a great deal of time among Muslims in Europe, I can tell you that, more than anything else, it is the core American belief that faith has a role to play in the public realm that has allowed American Muslims to so seamlessly reconcile their faiths, cultures, and traditions with the realities of American life. Say what you will, this is not, nor has it ever been, a "secular" country. It is, in fact, the most religiously diverse and religiously tolerant nation in the world. In no other country—and certainly no Islamic country—can Muslims pursue their faith and practice in whatever way they see fit than in the United States. It is, in short, America itself that has made American Muslims so much more resistant to the pull of jihadism than their European counterparts.

    This brings me to your excellent question regarding one of the central themes of Barrett's book. Is the Muslim encounter with the United States creating a new, American brand of Islam, much the way this country gave rise to new forms of Judaism and Catholicism? The short answer is yes. Just look at the Zaytuna Institute in Hayward, Calif., established by Sheikh Hamza Yusuf, an American convert and one of the world's most respected authorities on Islamic law. Tired of Muslims in the United States being forced to import their imams from countries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia—countries whose values and traditions are far removed from ours—Sheikh Hamza has created America's first Muslim seminary, to train American imams who can relate to the unique cultural and religious needs of American Muslims. But that's just part of the story. America also gives Muslims the freedom to explore issues like Islamic feminism (as demonstrated in Barrett's wonderful profile of my friend Asra Nomani, a journalist and author), Islamic pluralism, Islamic democracy, and even Islamic homosexuality, all of which has allowed Islam in America to flower into an independent and uniquely American faith.

    The real question, which you touch upon, is how the U.S. government, whose image in the Muslim world is at an all-time low, can tap into the American Muslims community and take advantage of what you rightly note may be America's greatest weapon against jihadism. I mean, if what you say is true—if the American Muslim community is the "first line of defense against jihadist attack" —then why have they seemingly been sidelined by the US government in this "great ideological battle for civilization"?

    Reza

    Reza Aslan is a research associate at the University of Southern California Center on Public Diplomacy and the author of No god but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam.
    Daniel Benjamin is a senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution and co-author of The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting It Right.

    Article URL: http://www.slate.com/id/2158114/

    Saturday, January 20, 2007

    Uncivilized Behavior

    This the kind of counter-productive behavior (on both sides) that President Carter refers to in his controversial book.


    Israel's Holocaust trustee blasts Hebron settlers
    Sat Jan 20, 2007 1:09 PM ET, Reuters

    By Dan Williams

    JERUSALEM (Reuters) - A senior official of Israel's central Holocaust memorial on Saturday assailed Jewish settlers who harass Palestinians in a tinderbox West Bank city, saying the abuse recalled the anti-Semitism of 1930s Europe.

    The fierce attack by Yosef Lapid, chairman of Yad Vashem's advisory council, was prompted by Israeli television footage showing a Hebron settler woman hissing "whore" at a Palestinian neighbor and settler children lobbing rocks at Arab homes.

    The spectacle stirred outrage in the Jewish state, where many view the settlers as opposing coexistence with a future Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

    Lapid, a Holocaust survivor who lost his father to the Nazi genocide, said in a weekly commentary on Israel Radio that the acts of some Hebron settlers reminded him of persecution endured by Jews in his native Yugoslavia on the eve of World War Two.

    "It was not crematoria or pogroms that made our life in the diaspora bitter before they began to kill us, but persecution, harassment, stone-throwing, damage to livelihood, intimidation, spitting and scorn," Lapid said, reiterating remarks made earlier this week in Israel's Maariv newspaper .

    "I was afraid to go to school, because of the little anti-Semites who used to lay in ambush on the way and beat us up. How is that different from a Palestinian child in Hebron?"

    Hebron has been a frequent flashpoint of more than six years of Israeli-Palestinian fighting. Some 400 settlers live there, under heavy Israeli military guard, among 150,000 Palestinians.

    "The man is obviously a very, very sick person, to compare the Jews in Hebron to barbarians and compare us to the Nazis," David Wilder, a spokesman for the settlers in Hebron, said in response to Lapid.

    Another community spokesman, Noam Arnon, played down the televised harassments as "fringe incidents," and told Israel Radio: "In six years, 37 Jews have been murdered in Hebron, and now they're preoccupied with curses?"

    CRACKDOWN OR COMPLACENCY?

    Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert ordered a cabinet-level probe last week into Palestinian allegations that abuse by Hebron settlers is commonplace and routinely ignored by Israel.

    Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh said he hoped for an Israeli crackdown against the settler "provocateurs", but Palestinian officials called for comprehensive action.

    "If they are serious about coexistence, the Israelis must take practical steps on the hundreds of daily violations against Palestinians in the old city," Hebron Governor Arif Jabari said.

    Jabari's apparent pessimism was shared by Lapid, a former Israeli justice minister.

    "We Jewish citizens of Israel wave a reprimanding finger at most," he said. "Worse still, I tolerated this silently as justice minister too."

    The World Court has branded the settlements illegal but many Jews claim a biblical birthright to the West Bank, which Israel captured from Jordan in the 1967 Middle East war.

    Israel withdrew settlers and soldiers from Gaza in 2005, a move billed as breaking the diplomatic deadlock with the Palestinians.

    The rise since of Hamas, a Palestinian Islamist group whose charter calls for the Jewish state's destruction, and a recent war against Hizbollah guerillas in Lebanon has hardened the resolve of Israeli rightists against ever leaving the West Bank.

    Lapid said while there was no comparing the Holocaust, in which 6 million Jews died, with Palestinian suffering from Israel's policies, this did not mean Israelis could not be culpable.

    "It is inconceivable for the memory of Auschwitz to warrant ignoring the fact that there are Jews among us who behave today toward Palestinians just like German, Hungarian, Polish and other anti-Semites behaved toward Jews," he said.

    (Additional reporting by Haitham Tamimi in Hebron and Allyn Fisher-Ilan in Jerusalem)


    Friday, January 19, 2007

    Yossi Bellin: The Case for Carter

    An Israeli view very much like my own. To read rest of article (there isn't too much more) click on post title above. For some more on the author, who has real credentials in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, see the following link:

    http://www.answers.com/topic/yossi-beilin


    The Case for Carter
    Opinion

    Looking at the controversy that has erupted over former President Jimmy Carter’s book, “Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid,” I have to say I am a little envious — envious of a national culture in which a book, or just a book title, can stir such a debate.

    I cannot recall when the publication of a book has generated such a debate in Israel. And even though we are talking here about a book that was published in the United States and has yet to be translated into Hebrew, the quiet way in which “Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid” has been received in Israel is nevertheless noteworthy, not least because it is Israel itself that is the object of Carter’s opprobrium.

    ....

    It is not that Israelis are indifferent to what is said about them, but the threshold of what passes as acceptable here is apparently much higher than it is with Israel’s friends in the United States. In the case of this particular book, the harsh words that Carter reserves for Israel are simply not as jarring to Israeli ears, which have grown used to such language, especially with respect to the occupation.

    In other words, what Carter says in his book about the Israeli occupation and our treatment of Palestinians in the occupied territories — and perhaps no less important, how he says it — is entirely harmonious with the kind of criticism that Israelis themselves voice about their own country. There is nothing in the criticism that Carter has for Israel that has not been said by Israelis themselves.

    ....

    Every Israeli, and every Jew to whom the destiny of Israel is important, is indebted to Carter for breaking the ring of hostility that had choked Israel for more than 30 years. No American president before him had dedicated himself so fully to the cause of Israel’s peace and security, and, with the exception of Bill Clinton, no American president has done so since.

    This is why the publication of Carter’s recent book, and perhaps more than anything else, the title it bears, has pained so many people. And I must admit that, on some deeply felt level, the title of the book has strained my heart, too. Harsh and awful as the conditions are in the West Bank, the suggestion that Israel is conducting a policy of apartheid in the occupied territories is simply unacceptable to me.

    But is this what Carter is saying? I have read his book, and I could not help but agree — however agonizingly so — with most if its contents. Where I disagreed was mostly with the choice of language, including his choice of the word “apartheid.”

    But if we are to be fair, and as any reading of the book makes clear, Carter’s use of the word “apartheid” is first and foremost metaphorical. Underlying Israel’s policy in the West Bank, he argues, is not a racist ideology but rather a nationalist drive for the acquisition of land. The resulting violence, and the segregationist policies that shape life in the West Bank, are the ill-intended consequences of that drive.

    Of course, there is no appropriate term in the political lexicon for what we in Israel are doing in the occupied territories. “Occupation” is too antiseptic a term, and does not capture the social, cultural and humanitarian dimensions of our actions. Given the Palestinians’ role in the impasse at which we have arrived, to say nothing of Arab states and, historically speaking, of the superpowers themselves, I would describe the reality of occupation as a march of folly — an Israeli one, certainly, but not exclusively so.

    But if we are to read Carter’s book for what it is, I think we would find in it an impassioned personal narrative of an American former president who is reflecting on the direction in which Israel and Palestine may be going if they fail to reach agreement soon. Somewhere down the line — and symbolically speaking, that line may be crossed the day that a minority of Jews will rule a majority of Palestinians west of the Jordan River — the destructive nature of occupation will turn Israel into a pariah state, not unlike South Africa under apartheid.

    In this sense, “Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid” is a stark warning to both Israelis and Palestinians of the choice they must make. That choice is between peace and apartheid, for the absence of one may well mean the other. Carter’s choice is clearly peace, and, for all its disquieting language, the book he has written is sustained by the hope that we choose peace, as well.

    Yossi Beilin, a member of the Knesset, is chairman of the Meretz-Yahad Party.

    Energy New Deal

    I like Friedman's argument for what I call "push-pull" energy policy.

    January 19, 2007
    Op-Ed Columnist, New York Times

    A Warning From the Garden

    Well, so much for our daffodils! They all bloomed in our front yard last week. They now form a nice bright yellow cluster at the bottom of our driveway. Temperatures of 65 degrees in Washington in January will do that. Frankly, daffodils in January do brighten up the lawn. Maybe next year we’ll try for roses in February.

    ....

    Even the White House seems to have noticed. Al Hubbard, the president’s economic adviser, says Mr. Bush will soon unveil an energy independence strategy that will produce “headlines above the fold that will knock your socks off.” Since everything the president has done on energy up to now has left my socks firmly in place, I will be eager to hear what Mr. Bush says.

    ....

    What would be compelling? I used to think it would be a “Manhattan Project” on energy. I don’t any longer. I’ve learned that there is no magic bullet for reducing our dependence on oil and emissions of greenhouse gases — and politicians who call for one are usually just trying to avoid asking for sacrifice today.

    The right rallying call is for a “Green New Deal.” The New Deal was not built on a magic bullet, but on a broad range of programs and industrial projects to revitalize America. Ditto for an energy New Deal. If we are to turn the tide on climate change and end our oil addiction, we need more of everything: solar, wind, hydro, ethanol, biodiesel, clean coal and nuclear power — and conservation.

    It takes a Green New Deal because to nurture all of these technologies to a point that they really scale would be a huge industrial project. If you have put a windmill in your yard or some solar panels on your roof, bless your heart. But we will only green the world when we change the very nature of the electricity grid — moving it away from dirty coal or oil to clean coal and renewables. And that is a huge industrial project — much bigger than anyone has told you. Finally, like the New Deal, if we undertake the green version, it has the potential to create a whole new clean power industry to spur our economy into the 21st century.

    To spark a Green New Deal today requires getting two things right: government regulations and prices. Look at California. By setting steadily higher standards for the energy efficiency of buildings and appliances — and creating incentives for utilities to work with consumers to use less power — California has held its per-capita electricity use constant for 30 years, while the rest of the nation has seen per- capita electricity use increase by nearly 50 percent, according to the Natural Resources Defense Council. That has saved California from building 24 giant power plants.

    ....

    But prices also matter. I don’t care whether it is a federal gasoline tax, carbon tax, B.T.U. tax or cap-and-trade system, power utilities, factories and car owners have to be required to pay the real and full cost to society of the carbon they put into the atmosphere. And higher costs for fossil fuels make more costly clean alternatives more competitive.

    ....

    This isn’t rocket science. Government standards matter. They drive innovation and efficiency. And prices matter. They drive more and cleaner energy choices. So when the president unveils his energy proposals, if they don’t call for higher efficiency standards and higher prices for fossil fuels — take your socks off yourself. It’s going to get hot around here.

    Thursday, January 18, 2007

    Common Sense on Iraq

    I worry about micro-management, but closer oversight by Congress certainly seems in order. The trick will be to find the right balance.


    Anatomy of a Wrong Approach

    By David S. Broder
    Thursday, January 18, 2007; A23, Washington Post

    The third or fourth time I heard Vice President Cheney tell Fox News's Chris Wallace on Sunday that al-Qaeda was gambling that the United States "doesn't have the stomach" to keep up the fight in Iraq, it crossed my mind that Cheney may be staring at the wrong part of the national anatomy.

    The question, really, is not whether we have the stomach for the fight but the brains to figure out what to do in Iraq.

    The vice president's effort to reduce it to a question of courage -- to suggest that those who want to expand the war are braver than those urging steps to limit it -- is a standard rhetorical trick. Whenever any Bush policy is questioned, someone from the administration almost automatically charges that its critics are soft on terrorism.

    Iraq requires thought, not just gut instinct, because we are struggling with a situation we've never faced before. What does America really know about how to deal with a Shiite-Sunni civil war in a land devastated by years of dictatorship, damaged by invasion, infiltrated by terrorists and surrounded by countries with their own territorial ambitions? Not much, which is why it behooves us to move with caution.

    The most serious thinking, inside and outside the administration, has concluded that it is fundamentally up to the government in Baghdad to curb the militias controlled by rival Sunni and Shiite clans. President Bush says the Iraqis can't do it alone, so he is sending more troops, 20,000 of them, to help Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his forces.

    Trouble is, no one knows if those Iraqi forces will show up to fight or, if they do, whether they will target anyone other than their Sunni enemies.

    The Iraq Study Group and a good many others urged Bush to demand action from Maliki before offering any further help. They said, let him show an effort to take control of the corrupt and sect-filled ministries, launch serious constitutional reform, divide up the oil revenue, start delivering services.

    Bush instead bought Maliki's argument that none of that is possible until Baghdad is more secure, and securing Baghdad means sending more troops into its high-risk urban warfare.

    Given the decision that Bush has made, is there anything Congress can do to protect American interests and save as many American lives as possible? Yes, there is. The lawmakers should hold Bush and Defense Secretary Robert Gates strictly to account for monitoring the action -- or inaction -- of the Maliki government.

    There is a lot of talk now on Capitol Hill about nonbinding resolutions opposing the "surge" of troops, or some sort of measure to limit or cut off the funds for that deployment. No such action is likely to have any impact on the president. The deployment has begun, and Bush is adamant about his authority as commander in chief to continue it.

    What Congress can demand is regular, frequent -- even weekly -- updates from the Pentagon, relayed from the able Gen. David Petraeus, the new commander in Iraq, about what the Iraqis are doing. The State Department should be delivering similar reports from the embassy in Baghdad on the operation of Maliki's government. Members of Congress ought to be traveling to Iraq themselves, checking out the reports with the troops who are bearing the brunt of the fighting.

    The administration may complain about this intense monitoring and call it micromanagement. But after the blunders of the past three years, neither the president nor our allies in Baghdad have earned the right to operate with a free hand.

    If Petraeus and his staff can provide specific measures of Iraqi military cooperation and progress, good. If the U.S. Embassy sees signs that the Maliki government is getting its act together, better yet. And if members of Congress can confirm these impressions on the ground in Baghdad, then take it to the bank.

    If not, then Congress should call on the president to "show some stomach" and tell Maliki that the game is coming to an end.

    Without a credible threat to walk away, there is every reason to believe that Maliki will attempt to use this expanded American force as a shield for the Shiite effort to drive the Sunni minority out of their homes and far from any share of power.

    That is not a goal worth one American life. And if it turns out that's what all this amounts to, then we will have no choice.

    Wednesday, January 17, 2007

    Medicare Hot Air

    Just in case you are interested (I am). For the rest of the statement, click on post title above.


    Medicare Hot Air
    Can the Democrats' bill bring lower drug prices? Don't count on it.

    January 17, 2007 , FactCheck.org

    Summary
    Democrats are overselling their Medicare prescription drug bill. They claim it will bring about big price cuts for medication while Medicare experts say it won't. Republicans have been equally misleading, describing the bill as a system of severe price controls, which it isn't.

    The fact is that the bill would do little more than require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to talk to drug companies about granting discounts. It specifically denies him the bargaining leverage of paying only for some drugs and not others.

    Analysis
    Ever since Congress passed President Bush's new prescription drug benefit for Medicare recipients, Democrats have been attacking it as a giveaway to drug companies. In the 2006 House and Senate campaigns, several TV ads attacked GOP lawmakers for supporting a law that forbids the federal government from negotiating directly with drug companies for lower prices. Democrats promised they would repeal that ban.

    Now Democrats are advancing such a bill, H.R. 4 , which passed the House last week by a vote of 255 to 170. Prospects in the Senate are unclear. Both sides are making vastly exaggerated claims about its likely effect, which independent experts describe as negligible.

    During debate, its chief sponsor John Dingell of Michigan flatly predicted big savings:

    Dingell: This legislation is simple and common sense. It will deliver lower premiums to the seniors, lower prices at the pharmacy and savings for all taxpayers . . . . I have confidence that Secretary [Mike] Leavitt can cut a good deal with the bargaining power of 43 million beneficiaries of Medicare behind him without restricting access to needed medicine.

    And Republicans described the bill as giving the government power to set drug prices. Rep. Michael Burgess of Texas took the lead for Republicans:

    Burgess: Under the guise of negotiation the Democrats propose to enact draconian price controls on pharmaceutical products.

    Both sides are blowing hot air. A number of experts, including the Congressional Budget Office and the chief actuary of the Medicare system, say the bill won't bring the lower prices Democrats promise. And contrary to the Republican claim, the actual language of the bill grants no price-setting authority to federal officials.

    ...

    Iraq: The Algerian Model

    I don't generally like Maureen Dowd's sarcastic columns, but this one has some very important points in it. To read the rest of the column. click on the post title above.




    January 17, 2007, New York Times
    Op-Ed Columnist

    Aux Barricades!

    WASHINGTON

    Being president can be really, really hard.

    “Sometimes you’re the commander in chief,” W. explained to Scott Pelley on “60 Minutes.” “Sometimes you’re the educator in chief, and a lot of times you’re both when it comes to war.”

    President Bush has been dutifully making the rounds of TV news shows, trying to make the case that victory in Iraq is “doable.” He thinks the public will support the Surge if he can simply illuminate a few things that we may have been too thick to understand. For instance, he says he needs to “explain to people that what happens in the Middle East will affect the future of this country.” Yes, Mr. President, we get it.

    ...

    It’s unnerving to be tutored by an educator in chief who is himself being tutored. The president elucidating the Iraqi insurgency for us is learning about the Algerian insurgency from the man who failed to quell the Vietcong insurgency.

    During his “60 Minutes” interview, Mr. Bush mentioned that he was reading Alistair Horne’s classic history, “A Savage War of Peace,” about why the French suffered a colonial disaster in a guerrilla war against Muslims in Algiers from 1954 to 1962.

    The book was recommended to W. by Henry Kissinger, who is working on an official biography of himself with Mr. Horne.

    ...

    Maybe it was inevitable, once W. started reading Camus’s “L’Etranger,” set in Algeria, that he would move on to Mr. Horne. As The Washington Post military correspondent Tom Ricks wrote in November, the Horne book has been an underground best-seller among U.S. military officers for three years, and “Algeria” has become almost a code word among counterinsurgency specialists for the mess in Iraq. The Pentagon screened the 1966 movie “The Battle of Algiers” in 2003, but the commander in chief must have missed it.

    I asked Mr. Horne, who was at his home in a small village outside Oxford, England, what the president could learn from his book.

    “The depressing problem of getting entangled in the Muslim world,” he replied. “Algeria was a thoroughly bloodthirsty war that ended horribly and cost the lives of about 20,000 Frenchmen and a million Algerians. There was a terrible civil war. ...De Gaulle ended up giving literally everything away and left without his pants.”

    President de Gaulle had all the same misconceptions as W., that his prestige could persuade the Muslims to accept his terms; that the guerrillas would recognize military defeat and accept sensible compromise; and that, as Mr. Horne writes, “time would wait while he found the correct formula and then imposed peace with it.”

    Mr. Horne also sees sad parallels in the torture issue: “The French had experience under the Nazis in the occupation and practiced methods the Germans used in Algeria and extracted information that helped them win the Battle of Algiers. But in the long run it lost the war, because it caused such revulsion in France when the news came out, and there was huge opposition to the war from Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir.”

    ...

    Sunday, January 14, 2007

    Being Jewish

    As an independent Jew (one that does not give knee-jerk support to Israel) I found the following "Leader" from this week's Economist particularly interesting. To read more on the subject from farther back in this week's Economist, click on the post title above.

    On a somewhat related issue, you might want to see the following article from this week's New York Times Magazine:

    http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/14/magazine/14foxman.t.html?_r=1&oref=slogin



    Israel and the Jews

    Diaspora blues
    Jan 11th 2007
    From The Economist print edition


    Jews around the world should join the debate about Israel, not just defend whatever it does

    Polaris
    Polaris


    WHAT is a Jewish state for, and what should it be like? Jews have been debating that for 200 years. Even today, with Israel already 58 years old and taken for granted by most of the rest of the world, they still cannot agree.

    The early settlers came for a variety of reasons. Some wanted to escape the stifling constraints of religious dogma and east European village communities; others thought it would hasten the coming of the Messiah. As European anti-Semitism grew, the idea took hold that Jews needed their own land as a safe haven. After the Holocaust, saving Jewish lives became the fledgling state's first priority. Soon, it acquired another role: being a potential Israeli citizen became one of the anchor points of what it meant to be a Jew.

    Since then, Jews have continued debating and reshaping their own relationships to the country. In Israel secular Jews found Israeliness a handy substitute for religious observance. Some religious Jews, for their part, revived the previously fringe creed of messianic Zionism, holding that to settle in all the biblical land—including the lands Israel captured after 1967—is a God-given duty. To others, the ultra-Orthodox, a Jewish state should spend as much as possible on subsidising Jewish learning and maintaining piety. And of these groups there are countless splinters and crossbreeds.

    Meanwhile, diaspora Jews have developed an even more eclectic mix of Jewish culture and attitudes to Zionism (see article). And that is partly because, as the threat of genocide or of Israel's destruction has receded, a growing number of diaspora Jews neither feel comfortable with always standing up for Israel, nor feel a need to invoke Israel in defining what makes them Jewish.

    Yet the big Jewish diaspora institutions have not caught up. Their relationship with Israel is still based mainly around supporting it in times of crisis and defending it from critics. This is true of the big umbrella groups for Jewish communities, but especially so of the pro-Israel lobby groups in America, formed to influence American foreign policy in Israel's favour. Often these lobbies have ended up representing not Israel but its right-wing political establishment, with American defenders of Israel accusing critics of being “anti-Semitic” for saying things that are commonplace in Israel's own internal debate.


    Their attitude persists partly because Israel was indeed much more vulnerable when the lobbies were founded; partly because the lazy way to defend Israel is to suggest that its critics, even legitimate ones, are anti-Semites; and partly because the pro-Israel lobbies have formed an unholy alliance with evangelical Christian groups who believe, like the religious Zionists, that the ingathering of the Jewish exiles will bring forward Judgment Day. In their fervour, these evangelical Christians are more uncompromisingly Zionist than most Jews. That they also believe that Judgment Day will entail the destruction of Israel and the deaths of a great many Jews does not seem to bother the Jewish lobbies; that, after all, is the theology of the future, and their job is the politics of today.

    This knee-jerk defensiveness of Israel does not help the Jewish diaspora, at least in terms of keeping young Jews from leaving the faith. Some find the uncritical attitude to Israel distasteful; others simply find Israel irrelevant. Some strike out on their own, finding new and creative ways to explore their Judaism. But many are simply drifting away.

    The tendency to stand by Israel right or wrong brings a second problem. It locks diaspora Jews out of the fateful and often bitter debates that rage inside Israel itself. Israel is an increasingly divided society. Secular and religious Jews used to have more beliefs in common, albeit for different reasons (eg, holding on to the occupied territories, whether for security or for religious redemption), but for decades their interests have been diverging. They disagree on the most basic questions: borders, who is a Jew, the role of religion, the status of non-Jews. Lately the traditional political boundaries have been melting down too. Israeli Jews swim in a sea of conflicting ideas about who they should be. Unless they agree on that, they cannot ultimately resolve their relationship with the Palestinians, including the Palestinians who are Israeli citizens.

    Helping Israel should no longer mean defending it uncritically. Israel is strong enough to cope with harsh words from its friends. So diaspora institutions should, for example, feel free to criticise Israeli politicians who preach racism and intolerance, such as a recently appointed cabinet minister, Avigdor Lieberman. They should encourage lively debate about Israeli policies. Perhaps more will then add their voices to those of the millions of Israelis who believe in leaving the occupied territories so that Palestinians can have a state of their own, allowing an Israel at peace to return to its original vocation of providing a safe and democratic haven for the world's Jews.

    Saturday, January 13, 2007

    Sarkozy on EU Reform

    Although a bit dated, the following summarizes the views of French right's candidate for the presidency in 2007. To read the entire speech, click on the post title above.

    EU reform: What we need to do

    by Nicolas Sarkozy, Europe's World

    What can Europe's political leaders do to regain popular support for the EU and get it moving again? Nicolas Sarkozy explains his strategy for unblocking the deadlock with a "mini-treaty" and for streamlining the European institutions

    Next year's 50th anniversary of the EU's founding Rome treaty should be celebrated with pride, for it marks an historic achievement: half a century of re-uniting a divided continent thanks to the democratic vision of founding fathers like Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak, Alcide de Gasperi and Konrad Adenauer. But there is also cause for concern because the European project is in crisis; it may not be a clear cut crisis, but it is a profound one.

    The forces driving the Union's political momentum have run out of steam, and Europe's citizens are either doubtful or indifferent to its aims and lack any real collective hope for the future. Some people, notably in France, think this sort of disenchantment is quite natural, but I disagree. In my view, the whole question of European integration is capable of once again inspiring popular enthusiasm; I believe that the "political Europe" I have always had faith in can still be attained....


    This article is based on the speech that Nicolas Sarkozy gave on September 8, 2006 at the Brussels think tank Friends of Europe (www.friendsofeurope.org) in association with the Fondation Robert Schuman (www.robert-schuman.org)

    Iraq Political Cartoons

    To see more cartoons on this topic from Slate Magazine, click on post title above.



    Friday, January 12, 2007

    Two Wars in Iraq

    What follows is a particularly useful summary of the state of things in Iraq and President Bush's recent decision to "surge" (a.k.a., "escalate", or "double down"):

    Bush refuses to confront the war that he is losing in Iraq

    By Philip Stephens

    Published: January 12 2007 02:00 | Last updated: January 12 2007 02:00, Financial Times

    There have been two wars in Iraq.

    The first has been the one in the mind of George W. Bush - in the brilliant phrase of the American scholar Mark Danner, a war of the imagination*. This designates Iraq as the cockpit of a Manichean struggle against Islamist terrorism. Victory is the only option if, in the president's words this week, the US is not to surrender the future to extremists.

    The second war has been the one we watch nightly on our television screens - the insurgency-cum-sectarian bloodletting that has cost 3,000 American and countless times as many Iraqi lives. In this grindingly vicious, increasingly complex conflict the US has for some time been facing defeat.

    Last November the two wars, the imagined and the real, might well have converged. The heavy losses suffered by the Republicans in the mid-term elections carried the message that America had lost faith in Mr Bush's war. The voters wanted the troops to come home. Even as they spoke, the Baker-Hamilton study group concluded with commendable candour that the real war was indeed being lost. Surely, the pretence would have to end

    Those who thought so underestimated, if that is the right word, Mr Bush. The president, as we heard again this week, will not let go of the war of the imagination.

    Iraq is fracturing along its sectarian and ethnic fault lines; the government of Nouri al-Maliki is propped up by Moktada al-Sadr's Mahdi army, the nastiest of the Shia militias; the Sunni insurgency is undiminished; Iran and Syria are doing their best to stir further mischief. Mr Bush's answer is another 20,000 troops and a change in the rules of engagement.

    This, it should be recalled, is not the first overhaul of Iraq policy. In November 2005, the White House published a National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. Much of what Mr Bush said this week echoes that document. Sceptics will recall that the latest escalation of American forces will do little more than restore them to the levels of 15 months ago.

    In its own terms it makes sense,

    as Mr Bush now proposes, to embark on a determined effort to pacify Baghdad as a building block for reconciliation and reconstruction. Few would quarrel, either, with the president's stern warning that

    Mr Maliki must reach out to marginalised Sunnis and former Ba'athists. To have the slimmest chance of stabilising Iraq, the US must break the vicious circle that holds politics hostage to violence and security to political deadlock.

    Mr Bush, though, has willed the ends without the means. Even if Iraq's Shia leadership is willing to tame its militias - a doubtful proposition - 20,000 additional US troops is woefully inadequate. Treble or quadruple that number, military strategists say, and a "clear and hold" strategy in Baghdad might just work. In any event, Mr Bush has announced that the so-called surge is strictly temporary, thus further diminishing its likely effectiveness.

    Missing too is a political roadmap, for Iraq or for the region. Necessary though it is, admonishing Mr Maliki to engage the Sunnis is not of itself a strategy for political reconciliation. Reminding Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Jordan that they have an important stake in Iraq's stability likewise does not substitute for engagement with Iran and Syria.

    Here, Mr Bush has ignored the Baker-Hamilton insight that it will be impossible to stabilise Iraq without at least the tacit acceptance of its neighbours and above all of Iran. To the president's mind, talking to your enemies is an admission of defeat. The irony is that, in the context of Iraq, to refuse to engage with those enemies makes a certainty of defeat.

    What we are left with, then, is a president still fighting the simple war he thought he had started in 2003. This owes nothing to the bloody tapestry created by myriad power struggles in Iraq. Instead, America is facing a finite number of Ba'athist and foreign diehards who, with resolve, can be beaten in battle.

    Mr Bush, of course, has not been alone in his delusions during these past few years. It is not that long since Dick Cheney, the vice-president, was publicly declaring the insurgency to be in "its last throes". It will be for historians to judge when precisely the US lost the war. To my mind, though, there is a good case to pinpoint two moments almost at the outset. The first was Donald Rumsfeld's response to the rioting and looting in the aftermath of the fall of Baghdad. "Stuff happens," the then defence secretary breezed, even as he prepared to reduce US troop levels in the face of rising disorder. Soon after, the administration handed the enemy 350,000 recruits by disbanding the army and purging Ba'athists.

    The sadness is that the descent into chaos was predicted as well as predictable. In 1999 the generals and policymakers in Washington carried out a series of planning exercises for the occupation of Iraq. The now unclassified conclusions have recently been published by the National Security Archive.

    "A change in regime," the authors of the exercise code-named Desert Crossing noted, "does not guarantee stability . . . aggressive neighbours, fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines, and chaos created by rival forces bidding for power could adversely affect stability".

    They calculated that a force of 400,000 and an occupation lasting perhaps a decade would be necessary to build stable self-government in Baghdad. Even then, the assumption was that retribution against the Ba'athists would be limited and the army would be kept intact.

    The point these policymakers came back to again and again was a need to reach an accommodation with the regional powers, if necessary by ending the isolation of Iran. With what now seems like extraordinary prescience but at the time was seen as common sense, they cautioned: "More so than any other country in the region, mismanagement of Iran, with all its capabilities and possible intentions, could be disastrous for the United States and the coalition." And so it has proved.

    One temptation now is to see Mr Bush's latest strategy as a cynical manoeuvre. It might be an effort to run down the clock of his presidency - leaving the Saigon moment to his successor. Alternatively, the president might be seeking political cover for retreat later in the year - the administration could at least say it had done its best. My own inclination is to believe the worst. Mr Bush is still fighting that other war.

    Thursday, January 11, 2007

    How Globalization Went Bad

    This is a really worthwhile article, even if the title is not really right for the content. In my mind, a better title would have been: "The Risks of a Unipolar World". To read the whole article and see what I mean, click on the post title above.

    How Globalization Went Bad

    By Steven Weber, Naazneen Barma, Matthew Kroenig, Ely Ratner
    Page 1 of 4
    January/February 2007, Foreign Policy
    From terrorism to global warming, the evils of globalization are more dangerous than ever before. What went wrong? The world became dependent on a single superpower. Only by correcting this imbalance can the world become a safer place.

    The world today is more dangerous and less orderly than it was supposed to be. Ten or 15 years ago, the naive expectations were that the “end of history” was near. The reality has been the opposite. The world has more international terrorism and more nuclear proliferation today than it did in 1990. International institutions are weaker. The threats of pandemic disease and climate change are stronger. Cleavages of religious and cultural ideology are more intense. The global financial system is more unbalanced and precarious.

    It wasn’t supposed to be like this. The end of the Cold War was supposed to make global politics and economics easier to manage, not harder. What went wrong? The bad news of the 21st century is that globalization has a significant dark side. The container ships that carry manufactured Chinese goods to and from the United States also carry drugs. The airplanes that fly passengers nonstop from New York to Singapore also transport infectious diseases. And the Internet has proved just as adept at spreading deadly, extremist ideologies as it has e-commerce....

    Perfect for these Times

    Low concept
    The G.W. Bush Severance Package
    His stock is falling. He has lost the confidence of shareholders. So how much would it take to make him go away?
    By Henry Blodget
    Posted Thursday, Jan. 11, 2007, at 1:43 PM ET, Slate Magazine

    Dear Mr. Bush:

    This memo sets forth the terms of the severance agreement reached this morning between your representatives and the Board of Directors regarding your contemplated departure as Chief Executive Officer of United States of America, Inc. (Hereafter: "USA, Inc.").

    The Board acknowledges that you believe you are doing "a heck of a job" and that, if not for weak-willed defeatists in Congress, the White House, the news media, the Democratic Party, the military, Iraq, the G7, and the voting public, the rest of the world might agree. The Board acknowledges that your representatives have produced evidence that you believe supports your assessment of your job performance and challenges the expertise and motives of your detractors. Without passing judgment on such evidence, the Board will try to honor your request that it be made available to "patriotic" historians.

    The Board agrees to accept any hypothetical resignation you may decide to offer. If you decide to resign, the Board understands that you will do so "for personal reasons" and "to spend more time with your family." The Board agrees that any such resignation would be voluntary.

    Lastly, the Board agrees that, if you resign, Mr. Richard Cheney will immediately be sworn in as the company's 44th President. Mr. Cheney will issue two executive orders—the first anointing you the "Freedom, Democracy, and Victory President," and the second pardoning you. Having ensured his presidential legacy, Mr. Cheney will then resign, citing health reasons.

    About Your Severance Package:

    Your representatives provided the Board with a recommended hypothetical severance package developed by your severance consultants. The Board acknowledges that your severance consultants have extraordinary experience and expertise in this arena, having advised on 185 CEO departures in the last three years. The Board agrees that, should you resign, your Hypothetical Severance Package will become your Severance Package.

    Terms of Your Hypothetical Severance Package

    In gratitude for your past six years of service as the War President and your future years of service as the Freedom, Democracy, and Victory President, you will receive:

    • A lump-sum equivalent to a modest 0.02 percent of the Gross Domestic Product of USA, Inc. in your six years of leadership (calculated by annualizing the final year), as well as an additional bonus of 0.02 percent of projected GDP for the next two years. Your severance consultants note that this percentage is less than half of that recently received by another departing Chief Executive, Home Depot's Robert Nardelli. (The Board thanks you for your sacrifice.) The special additional bonus will compensate you for the inconvenience of having to relocate two years earlier than expected.
    • The Board recognizes that the above lump-sum payment of $21 billion will create a substantial tax burden for you and your family. The Board regrets that it cannot decree that income taxes on Chief Executive Officer severance packages "be temporarily waived to stimulate the economy and create jobs." As a result, the Board will accept your alternate recommendation that the sum be structured as a Special Ex-CEO Trust, from which you will receive interest and dividends tax-free. Your consultants estimate that this will produce a lifetime income of $1 billion per year.
    • Because the above income may not support the lifestyle to which you are accustomed, you will also receive the following nonmonetary compensation:

    *Lifetime use of U.S. military transport aircraft, as well as complimentary joy rides in all new fighter planes, tanks, assault vehicles, and moon rockets.

    *Right of first refusal on all future military contracts for any companies you work for, serve as a director of, or own shares in.

    *Full military pension for your service as a member of the National Guard and Commander in Chief.

    *Full Social Security and Medicare benefits, even if such programs are eliminated.

    *Full government pension and benefits, including full health care, dental care, psychiatric care, and drug and alcohol rehabilitation coverage.

    *Full memberships at any clubs you wish to belong to, including Augusta National and the Dick Cheney Memorial Quail Sanctuary and Wildlife Refuge Hunting Club.

    *Four full-time assistants to handle your communications needs.

    • If you predecease your wife, Laura, the above benefits will accrue to her (except, for obvious reasons, the membership at Augusta National). If you and Laura predecease your children, the above benefits will accrue to them. If your family predeceases your fellow patriot Mr. Karl Rove, the above benefits shall accrue to him.

    The Board agrees that the terms of this hypothetical severance agreement are merely hypothetical, that you have not decided to resign, and that you may not decide to resign. The Board recognizes that you alone are the Decider, and it does not in any way wish to influence or rush your decision. The Board regrets, however, that given the rate at which USA, Inc. shareholder frustration is increasing, the terms of this hypothetical severance agreement will expire at sundown.

    Sincerely,
    The Board of Directors
    USA, Inc.

    Henry Blodget, a former securities analyst, is the author of The Wall Street Self-Defense Manual.

    An Interesting Analysis of President Bush's "New Way Forward"

    I am skeptical about what President Bush announced last evening, for the reasons cited by David Brooks, as well as some others. I also agree that those opposed to what the President proposes owe us something concrete with which to compare the "New Way Forward".


    January 11, 2007
    Op-Ed Columnist, New York Times
    The Fog Over Iraq
    By DAVID BROOKS

    If the Democrats don’t like the U.S. policy on Iraq over the next six months, they have themselves partly to blame. There were millions of disaffected Republicans and independents ready to coalesce around some alternative way forward, but the Democrats never came up with anything remotely serious.

    The liberals who favor quick exit never grappled with the consequences of that policy, which the Baker-Hamilton commission terrifyingly described. The centrists who believe in gradual withdrawal never explained why that wouldn’t be like pulling a tooth slowly. Joe Biden, who has the most intellectually serious framework for dealing with Iraq, was busy yesterday, at the crucial decision-making moment, conducting preliminary fact-finding hearings, complete with forays into Iraqi history.

    The Democrats have been fecund with criticisms of the war, but when it comes to alternative proposals, a common approach is social Darwinism on stilts: We failed them, now they’re on their own.

    So we are stuck with the Bush proposal as the only serious plan on offer. The question is, what exactly did President Bush propose last night? The policy rollout has been befogged by so much spin and misdirection it’s nearly impossible to figure out what the president is proposing.

    Nonetheless, here’s my reconstruction of how this policy evolved:

    On Nov. 30, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki presented Bush with a new security plan for Baghdad. It called for U.S. troops to move out of Baghdad to the periphery, where they would chase down Sunni terrorists. Iraqi Shiite and Kurdish troops, meanwhile, would flood into the city to establish order, at least as they define it.

    Maliki essentially wanted the American troops protecting his flank but out of his hair. He didn’t want U.S. soldiers embedded with his own. He didn’t want American generals hovering over his shoulder. His government didn’t want any restraints on Shiite might.

    Over the next weeks, Bush rejected the plan and opted for the opposite approach. Instead of handing counterinsurgency over to the Iraqis/Shiites, he decided to throw roughly 20,000 U.S. troops — everything he had available — into Baghdad. He and his advisers negotiated new rules of engagement to make it easier to go after Shiites as well as Sunnis. He selected two aggressive counterinsurgency commanders, David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno, to lead the effort. Odierno recently told John Burns of The Times that American forces would remain in cleared areas of Baghdad “24/7,” suggesting a heavy U.S. presence.

    Then came the job of selling the plan. The administration could not go before the world and say that the president had decided to overrule the sovereign nation of Iraq. Officials could not tell wavering Republicans that the president was proposing a heavy, U.S.-led approach.

    Thus, administration officials are saying that they have adopted the Maliki plan, just with a few minor tweaks. In briefings and in the president’s speech, officials claimed that this was an Iraqi-designed plan, that Iraqi troops would take on all the primary roles in clearing and holding neighborhoods, that Iraqis in mixed neighborhoods would scarcely see any additional Americans.

    All of this is designed to soothe the wounded pride of the Maliki government, and to make the U.S. offensive seem less arduous at home. It’s the opposite of the truth.

    Yesterday, administration officials were praising Maliki lavishly. He wants the same things we want, they claimed. He has resolved to lead a nonsectarian government. He is reworking his governing coalitions and marginalizing the extremists. “We’ve seen the nascent rise of a moderate political bloc,” one senior administration official said yesterday.

    But the selling of the plan illustrates that this is not the whole story. The Iraqi government wants a unified non-sectarian solution in high-minded statements and in some distant, ideal world. But in the short term, and in the deepest reptilian folds of their brains, the Shiites are maneuvering amid the sectarian bloodbath all around.

    This is not a function of the character of Maliki or this or that official. It’s a function of the core dynamic now afflicting Iraqi society.

    The enemy in Iraq is not some discrete group of killers. It’s the maelstrom of violence and hatred that infects every institution, including the government and the military. Instead of facing up to this core reality, the Bush administration has papered it over with salesmanship and spin.