This is meant to be a way of describing/ discussing some of my photos and miscellaneous thoughts. Your comments and suggestions will be most appreciated. Either English or French are welcome.

Showing posts with label The Global Automotive Industry. Show all posts
Showing posts with label The Global Automotive Industry. Show all posts

Wednesday, March 21, 2007

Gore: Don't single out cars and trucks to solve global warming

Agree with Al Gore in general or not, his advise regarding the automotive industry makes a lot a sense.


Gore: Don't single out cars and trucks to solve global warming

Harry Stoffer | Automotive News / March 21, 2007 - 11:41 am




WASHINGTON -- Automakers have an ally of sorts -- in Al Gore.

In a highly anticipated appearance before Congress today, the former vice president said he supports higher fuel economy standards. But automakers alone should not be expected to solve global warming, he contended.

"Don't single out cars and trucks," Gore said in a lengthy statement before a pair of House subcommittees. He described emissions from motor vehicles as "only a slice of the problem" and not the biggest slice.

Still, the future Gore envisions would be vastly different. He called for an immediate freeze on greenhouse-gas emissions and a 90 percent cut in those emissions by 2050. He did not say exactly how those moves could be accomplished.

The ranking Republican on the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Rep. Joe Barton of Texas, said a freeze, if taken literally, would mean no new businesses, no economic growth and no more people.

Gore also called for:
  • Taxes on the carbon in fuels, offset by cuts in payroll taxes.
  • U.S. participation in a new international treaty on climate change, which would follow the Kyoto treaty rejected by Congress and the Bush administration.
  • Programs that would encourage consumers to generate their own electricity through means that don't release greenhouse gases into the air.


Gore said such steps are needed to deal with "a crisis that is by far the most serious we have ever faced." He has achieved international recognition for his Oscar-winning documentary on global warming, An Inconvenient Truth.

Auto industry leaders who testified last week before a subcommittee of the Energy and Commerce Committee said they could support a cap on total U.S. emissions. But they said the burden for compliance should be spread across all businesses.

Automakers say that regulators should determine the highest feasible fuel economy standards and that lawmakers should not arbitrarily set tougher standards.

Wednesday, March 14, 2007

It's About Time, But Don't Be Too Subtle

I am glad that someone is taking the lead here, although more directness and coordination (e.g., through AAMA) stands a better chance of driving change (maybe). To read the rest of the article, click on post title.

Industry chiefs: Higher CAFE is not the only answer

Harry Stoffer | Automotive News / March 14, 2007 - 12:44 pm / UPDATED: 3/14/07 2 P.M.





WASHINGTON -- Government should take steps to boost consumer demand for fuel-efficient vehicles, top auto industry executives told lawmakers today.

Simply raising fuel economy standards is not the answer to the threat of global warming or the nation's energy supply concerns, the executives argued.

In Europe, automakers achieve fuel economy levels that some members of Congress want to require in the United States. But much higher gasoline prices in Europe create consumer demand, Chrysler group CEO Tom LaSorda said in prepared testimony before a panel of the House Energy and Commerce Committee.

LaSorda did not call directly for higher U.S. gasoline taxes but said "a new and unique formula" for the United States should include "harnessing of market forces." Other company executives noted that Chrysler has endorsed higher gasoline taxes in the past.

The House panel sought testimony on the industry's role in combating global warming and improving energy security. Called to testify today at the unusual hearing were the CEOs of the Detroit 3; the president of Toyota Motor North America Inc., Jim Press; and UAW President Ron Gettelfinger.

'New approach'

U.S. Rep. John Dingell, D-Mich., chairman of the full committee, signaled before the hearing that he is receptive to ideas beyond corporate average fuel economy standards. In a conference call with reporters Tuesday, March 13, Dingell said: "We need a new approach." He did not elaborate.

....

Wednesday, March 07, 2007

Yet Another Sane Voice on Fuel Taxes

An article in today's Detroit News makes the argument for higher fuel taxes, among other useful points. To read the entire article, click on post title.


....

"Fuel taxes move auto market

"The overriding consideration is that it is fuel taxation policies -- not automakers -- that drive consumers to buy differing vehicle types. If gasoline was priced two or three times higher in the United States and if high quality diesel fuel was available here at a lower cost than gasoline, then you can bet Americans would be interested in much more fuel efficient vehicles.

"In the meantime, with our lifestyle and relatively cheap fuel, there is a good reason that full-size pick-up trucks like the Ford-F-150 and the Chevrolet Silverado have been America's best selling vehicles for decades...."

Monday, February 26, 2007

Jerry Brown: Automotive Champion?!

Let's assume that Jerry Brown wants to be constructive. He admits that he has no idea how to change consumer behavior. Let the automakers wave their magic technological wand. I will still argue that suitable purchase and use taxation will be the most effective aid to changing automotive consumer behavior, giving a realistic chance of California's concerns with Global Warming to be addressed in the real world. (click on post title for rest of column.)





EYES ON THE ROAD
By JOSEPH B. WHITE







California, Auto Makers Battle
Over Vehicle Emissions

Flurry of Litigation Over Efforts to Reduce
The Environmental Impact of Cars, Trucks
February 24, 2007, Wall Street Journal

When it comes to automobiles, California isn't just another state. It's something close to a sovereign nation -- a nation currently at war with a fair chunk of the auto industry.

California's recent efforts to regulate carbon dioxide emissions as a pollutant, and to mandate reductions of CO2 emissions, including gases coming out of vehicle tailpipes, has provoked a flurry of litigation with big auto makers. The car companies contend California's efforts to clamp down on CO2 amount to an effort to regulate fuel economy, and states have no right to supersede federal fuel efficiency laws. The state has countered that car makers, by persisting in selling gas guzzlers to Californians, are creating a public nuisance by contributing to the ill effects caused by global warming -- including rising sea levels that could threaten California's 1,075 miles of coastline and dwindling mountain snows that could undermine the state's water supply. (Read the complaint1)

Into this fight comes now California Attorney General Edmund G. Brown -- yes, that Jerry Brown, the former California governor who ran for president three times and more recently was Mayor of Oakland. Mr. Brown inherited the litigation with the auto industry when he took his current office in January. Some have called on Mr. Brown to quit the state's legal fight with the auto industry. But Mr. Brown has chosen a different tack. He has called on the chief executives of the six biggest auto makers in the U.S. market to meet with him to find "cooperative approaches" to the global warming issue. (Read his letter2)

So far, the auto makers have declined, through their attorney, to schedule a CEO summit. Instead they have offered to send "legal representatives" to brief Mr. Brown on the industry's "multi-faceted efforts to improve fuel efficiency." So what does Jerry Brown really want? In a telephone interview, the attorney general says his real goal is to help the car companies.

"This is not a problem that is going to be swept under the rug," he says. "It is getting intense scrutiny. Even a year ago, people would not expect we would be as far into this issue as we are."

....

Mr. Brown also remembers that when he was governor, the auto makers fought seat belts. And he says electric cars, once mandated under California law, "died because the car companies wanted (them) to die."

Industry executives counter that electric cars died because they were exorbitantly expensive, and the vast majority of consumers had no interest in buying them, preferring instead the larger, heavier vehicles Mr. Brown is denouncing.

But Mr. Brown's point is that the auto industry has a long history of insisting that it cannot profitably build cleaner, safer cars -- only to be shown up when such advances turn out to be both possible and profitable.

....

To a significant degree, the dispute between California and the car makers is a culture clash. California has a long history of using its special status as the nation's biggest car market to press for risk-taking on advanced technology. This is what you'd expect from a state whose economy is based to a great degree on nimble, high-tech entrepreneurship.

Auto makers, by contrast, are stuck with a business that involves sinking enormous chunks of capital into machinery and factories staffed by thousands of workers whose labors will yield a return only after several years. Those returns will come only if the car makers haven't misjudged, while planning their vehicles three to five years earlier, consumer tastes or the price of oil. The risks inherent in auto making breed a certain conservatism -- all the more so given the inconsistent track record of various on-board gadgetry.

The other problem is that car makers don't create CO2 emissions by driving cars. People do. Mr. Brown, who says his last car was a Mercury Sable purchased in 1991, concedes that changing Californians' motoring habits won't be easy, he says.

....






Monday, February 12, 2007

Putting the Heat on Global Warming

Yet another voice of reason. To read complete article, click on post title.

John McCormick

Putting the heat on global warming

Detroit News, February 12, 2007

....

All these considerations aside, the rational minds running Motown's automakers are left facing a dilemma. On the one hand they know that the modern automobile is actually responsible for a relatively small part of the emissions 'load' that mankind's activities impose on the earth. At the same time they recognize that cars - versus coal-fired power plants, heavy industry or even the hundreds of jets streaking across our skies daily - are far more visible to the general public. Unjust though it is, the automobile's exhaust pipe has become the poster child for air pollution and, by extension, global warming.

As a consequence, environmentalists repeatedly attack the auto industry as if it is single handedly to blame for the planet's climatic problems, real or imagined. The so-called 'greens' argue that the carmakers must sell vehicles that they think people should buy, rather than the vehicles people want to buy, thus ignoring the most basic tenet of a market driven economy.

These same activists point to General Motors' withdrawal of the plug-in electric car, the EV1, during the 1990s, as proof that the auto industry is not serious about producing environmentally sensitive vehicles. The absurdity of this argument is self-evident. Does anyone truly believe that GM chose to waste billions of dollars on a vehicle that would not succeed? The fact that only a few people bought the EV1 (or any other electric vehicle of the time) was because they were impractical. Consumers in a free market economy buy what they wish to buy; be it a Hummer, Toyota Prius or anything in between.

What influences the vehicle buyer's decision is a subtle combination of desire, practical considerations and dollars and cents. And it is this last factor that should be given the biggest weight as we debate the relationship between the automobile and the world's environment. It is not the job of the automobile industry to tell buyers what to purchase, any more than it is the job of house builders to promote smaller homes. This role is best played by the government, not by direct edict, but by exerting financial pressure on a vehicle purchaser's decision.

The most obvious example of this process in action is Europe's vehicular tax strategy. For example, European governments tax fuel in a manner that encourages diesel, which is much more energy efficient and therefore lower in CO2 emissions than gasoline. They also tax higher displacement engines, leading consumers and therefore automakers to concentrate on smaller, more efficient vehicles. This policy does not prevent consumers from buying larger cars and trucks, it simply makes the choice more expensive.

If a US administration, now or in the future, is ever to make a serious effort to curb this country's appetite for the world's energy resources and corresponding imbalance in overall emissions, then attacking the auto industry with legislation is not the answer. Nor is the misguided focus on grossly inefficient corn-based E85 production. It's wiser to concentrate on producing cellulosic-based ethanol, or much better still, to give major financial assistance to the development of advanced batteries for a new generation of electric cars.

But in the short term, the answer, as tough and unpalatable as it may be in some quarters, is to use taxes, not half baked rhetoric, to persuade consumers to modify their vehicle choices.

John McCormick is a columnist for Autos Insider and can be reached at john.mccormick@detnews.com

Monday, January 29, 2007

Technological Answers to CAFE?

The following article (click on the post title to read all of it) lists several practical and less-practical ways of meeting increased CAFE requirements. The one thing it does not discuss is to how to change consumer behavior, other than differential vehicle pricing.

In fact, in this week's Automotive News there are many articles related to President Bush's comments last week in his State of the Union message. Although I hardly read every line of every article, I saw no mention of fuel taxation in any of them. The subject is simply ignored by what proports to be the most comprehensive newspaper in the automotive industry. Strange.


Bush's shocker: How to meet a higher CAFE


Richard Truett | |

Automotive News | 1:00 am, January 29, 2007


First the good news: In theory, automakers can meet President Bush's call to improve fuel economy simply by commercializing off-the-shelf technologies.

But it's going to cost plenty. If light-vehicle CAFE standards rise by a third by 2017, to 34 mpg, as President Bush proposed last week, we'll see a more small cars, diesels and hybrids.

Here are the technologies that could deliver big gains in fuel economy, along with ratings for practicality and cost. A score of 5 five means the technology could be on your driveway soon. A rating of 1 means the technology is the modern equivalent of the 100-mpg carburetor....




Best bets
How various fuel-saving technologies are likely to fare.
Winners: Turbochargers, diesels, starter generators, efficient transmissions
The jury is out: Lightweight materials, plug-in hybrids
Not in this lifetime: Fuel cells



          • Now that we've rated these technologies, we will offer a caveat on our grades. If Congress approves a steep increase in fuel economy, automakers inevitably will speed up introduction of these technologies.
          • One way to improve CAFE would be to manipulate the marketplace: Raise the price of big trucks and other gas hogs, then lower the price of smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicles. In the world of CAFE, this is a time-honored technique.

            So maybe we'll have to switch to pass-fail grades after all.

Friday, January 26, 2007

What A Great Idea

Why didn't we think of this a long time ago?

Return to regular web page


Detroit News Online


This is a printer friendly version of an article from The Detroit News
To print this article open the file menu and choose Print.



January 26, 2007

Daniel Howes

Daniel Howes: One bonus plan for all employees is bold move

F ord Motor Co. and UAW leaders, in a revolutionary bid to put real money behind the "we're-on-the-same-team" slogan, are in discussions to create a single incentive plan to cover all U.S. Ford employees, according to three ranking sources close to the situation.

Likely to be presented to Ford's directors in March, the plan would pay each hourly worker "somewhere between $500 and $1,000" in advance of this summer's national contract talks and set common performance targets for all of Ford's 115,600 U.S. employees -- salaried and union.

If ratified, the plan would create an unprecedented model of mutual interest between the UAW and Detroit's automakers. It would mollify critics outraged that Ford is mulling whether to pay bonuses to salaried employees for hitting predetermined targets. And it would closely bind all employees to the company's competitiveness, striking a blow to the malignant us-vs.-them culture of Detroit.

It would be, in a word, brilliant.

How can talk of bonuses be justified when Ford on Thursday posted a $12.7 billion loss -- the largest in its 103-year history? The same way CEO Alan Mulally theoretically justified paying bonuses to salaried employees for 2006:

They helped achieve massive restructuring targets on cost-cutting, quality and customer satisfaction, the precursors to delivering profits and expanding market share. Without the hard work of all Ford folks, from Glass House offices and engineering cubicles to the factory floor, the Blue Oval is toast.

It's all about "inclusion," Mulally told The Detroit News, referring to his notion of team-building. "It's about everybody knowing the business realities, everybody knowing what our plan is to deal with it. The most important thing to our employees is that we're compensating them competitively -- our executives, our management, all of our employees."

And, it should be added, compensating them fairly. That Ford would be considering bonuses for salaried employees when union members approved health care concessions for retirees, saving Ford close to $1 billion annually; or when most of its locals approved "competitive operating agreements"; or when 38,000 hourly workers accepted buyouts -- all of them saving Ford big dough -- strikes many as unfair.

Treating all the same

"Our current agreement does not give" union members "a penny," one source familiar with the talks told me, because the United Auto Workers' profit-sharing plan pays out only when Ford books profits from its U.S. operations. "It feeds divisiveness. You take away all that stuff. You have one Ford team working for the same objective. If you're in the money, you all benefit."

The logic behind the plan, similar to ones used at Boeing and Xerox, is that union and salaried employees would benefit if the company achieves incremental improvements of 15 percent or more annually on predetermined targets. Those include cost, cash flow, quality and customer satisfaction, as well as profitability and market share.

Ford and UAW officials declined comment.

If agreed to by both sides in a memorandum of understanding, pending ratification in this year's contract, the deal likely would pressure General Motors Corp. and the Chrysler Group to follow suit. Currently, Ford has five separate incentive/bonus plans, Chrysler has four and GM has three.

"If they eliminated the bonus pool and said we're using the same bonus formula for everybody, that would be a sea change in Detroit," said Sean McAlinden, chief economist at the Center for Automotive Research. "It's a big fairness issue. Let's recognize productivity change, flexibility -- the whole shot -- not just profits."

Ford's 'better idea'

It would be hard to overstate how revolutionary a change like this would be. Union and salaried folks would share incentives to achieve the same goals and would be rewarded for hitting or exceeding them -- a reflection of Mulally's intent that everyone be on the same page.

In Ford's often petty culture, salaried employees might grumble that union members are being rewarded for their innovative engineering, design or purchasing decisions. There might be concerns among the rank and file that jettisoning the traditional union profit-sharing plan for a single unified incentive plan might shortchange them.

But how? By its own admission, Ford will not be profitable in the United States until 2009, meaning UAW members are likely to go half a decade or more without seeing any profit sharing.

Under the plan being discussed by Ford and the UAW, members would see a modest payout this year for last year's progress and likely additional payouts in the next few years -- money they would never see under their profit-sharing plan.

"You're not going to be getting the same payout," one source said, "but you'll be working towards the same metrics."

Yes, the CEO would reap a bigger reward than a 10-year veteran of the assembly line. But they'd both be reaping a reward according to the same criteria.

'Equal sacrifice, equal gain'

If nothing else, Ford's year-end earnings and the outlook for this year and next, detailed Thursday, show how difficult the automaker's road back is likely to be. The brutal truth is, there are no guarantees Mulally & Co. will succeed.

They have too much plant capacity and too many people. Too much of their business model rests on slow-selling SUVs and pickups and not enough on fuel-efficient cars, crossovers and gas-electric hybrids. And brands like Jaguar Cars continue to consume cash and deliver losses.

But Mulally has told associates he regards a unified incentive plan as a potential game-changer, a rallying point that "makes so much sense" and could help Ford emerge from its funk sooner.

Pursuing the deal in advance of this summer's bargaining with the UAW gives UAW President Ron Gettelfinger and Vice President Bob King some help in selling an agreement likely to offer slim pay raises, if any, and changes to health-care benefits.

"Perceived fairness costs a great deal of votes on any contract," McAlinden said. "Equal sacrifice is something that's printed above every work station at Ford. You've got to give the equal sacrifice -- or equal gain."

Thursday, December 28, 2006

More Argument for Higher Fuel Taxes

Why can't most people understand this? Maybe, they all like the idea of a free lunch.


At Witz’ End: No Free Lunch at CAFE
You can’t get fuel economy for free.

There are those who understand and accept the laws of physics, and those who don't. Unfortunately, the latter group is a vast majority with no technical education or experience and clearly includes every lawmaker, environmentalist, and media member who believes that CAFE (Corporate Average Fuel Economy) needs to be substantially increased.

To believe that, these technically challenged people must believe: 1) that U.S. automakers continue to lag behind imports in fuel efficiency, 2) that they are withholding fuel economy technology that would make everyone's vehicles far more fuel efficient than they are today, but otherwise unchanged 3) that they must be forced to provide the higher mileage their customers demand, and 4) that 40-50-mpg vehicles - even if technically feasible - will offer the same features and capabilities at the same prices as today's 20-30-mpg cars and trucks.

But those armed with engineering knowledge and facts know the unfortunate truth.

Domestic makers can offer real data proving otherwise all day long, but people believe what they want to believe. And for some masochistic reason, they still want to believe their home teams are losing. Yes, at the dawn of CAFE in the wake of the 1970s fuel crises, American cars were less fuel efficient than European and Japanese models because they were bigger and heavier, and because fuel economy was not a high priority with U.S.-market gas ridiculously cheap. Today, with domestics selling plenty of excellent small cars and off-shore brands marketing more and more large, heavy luxury cars and trucks, that is not even remotely true. Pound for pound, dollar for dollar, fuel economy is a top priority for everyone, everyone is competitive and any differences between competing vehicles are small.

There is no magic technology…and if there were, why would American makers withhold it when superior fuel economy is a HUGE competitive advantage? And why would anyone with half a brain believe that any business must be forced to provide what its customers demand?

Fuel efficiency is mostly about weight. Depending on the rate of acceleration, it takes x amount of energy to accelerate y mass to z speed. Once it reaches that speed, aerodynamics play a major role because slipperier shapes require less energy to part the air. No one should be surprised that big, heavy, brick-shaped trucks burn a lot more fuel than small, light, sleekly shaped cars. Driving style (jerky/aggressive vs. smooth and gentle), tire rolling resistance, accessory loads, and even powertrain technology play much a smaller roles. Increasing efficiency through expensive technology usually adds more cost than benefit at U.S. gas prices. Smaller displacement reduces performance and load capability with little economy benefit, since a smaller engine works much harder than a larger one to pull the same load.

Engineers can reduce a vehicle's fuel consumption primarily by reducing its size and weight and secondarily by streamlining its body. Beyond these major factors, what remains are incremental enhancements in powertrain and vehicle efficiency. But the easiest and most affordable improvements were made long ago. What remains are measures worth fractions of miles per gallon at much higher costs.

Cars and trucks weigh what they do primarily because of their capabilities. They are the size and weight they are to carry what they do, perform as they do, tow what they can, and protect occupants in crashes as well as they do, at a given price level. A higher-economy SUV, for example, is by definition smaller and less capable. What combination of features and capabilities are buyers willing to sacrifice for higher efficiency: Cargo capacity? Off-road or all-weather capability? Towing capability? Roominess? Ride? Occupant protection? Affordability?

CAFE mandates the sales-weighted average economy of the total "fleets" of cars and trucks each company sells each year. It therefore reflects the "mix" of vehicles - the proportion of smaller to larger ones - an automaker sells, not the efficiency of individual vehicles within that mix. A full-line automaker naturally has a lower CAFE than most smaller companies because it sells more larger cars and trucks. To meaningfully raise its CAFE, an automaker has to downsize its mix of vehicles by convincing its customers to buy more, smaller, more fuel-efficient models and fewer of the larger, less efficient ones most Americans prefer.

"If you want people to eat less, you raise the price of food," GM Product Development Vice Chairman Bob Lutz once sagely said. "Instead, what the government is trying to do with CAFE is fight national obesity by making the clothing industry manufacture only small sizes."

Those who naively push for higher CAFE believe they'll get 50-mpg cars and 40-mpg SUVs with the same safety and capability they enjoy today at about the same price. They think they can have something for nothing - the proverbial "free lunch" - because they desperately want it. Ain't gonna happen, folks, because no one has figured out how to repeal those pesky laws of physics. What they'll get with higher CAFE is exactly what most Americans do not want - vehicles that are much smaller, lighter, less capable, less safe, and more expensive.

Contrary to what politicians and the popular press want us to believe - and as much as we all wish there were - there is no free lunch at this CAFE.

Saturday, December 09, 2006

Toyota: "Only the Paranoid Win..."

Most of those in the global automotive industry wish that they had these problems. But, one of Toyota's strengths over the years has been maintaining effective challenges before its employees so as to avoid hubris (as much as possible). Bravo.


Paranoid Tendency
As Rivals Catch Up,
Toyota CEO Spurs
Big Efficiency Drive

Culture of Institutional Worry
Drives Mr. Watanabe;
How Paint Is Like 'Fondue'
Finding Limits to Improvement
By NORIHIKO SHIROUZU
December 9, 2006; Page A1 Wall Street Journal

TOYOTA CITY, Japan -- The world sees Toyota Motor Corp. as an unstoppable profit juggernaut, overtaking rivals one by one as it rolls toward replacing General Motors Corp. as the world's largest auto maker.

Not Katsuaki Watanabe. Toyota's chief executive officer is a worried man. He thinks Toyota is losing its competitive edge as it expands around the world. He frets that quality, the foundation of its U.S. success, is slipping. He grouses that Toyota's factories and engineering practices aren't efficient enough. Within the company, he has even questioned a core tenet of Toyota's corporate culture -- kaizen, the relentless focus on incremental improvement.

U.S. and European car makers have spent years struggling to overhaul outdated operations and work practices to better compete with Toyota. By some measures, some of those companies are catching up. Now, driven by a severe dose of institutional paranoia, Mr. Watanabe is trying to move the target.

Mr. Watanabe, 64 years old, wants kakushin, or revolutionary change in how Toyota designs cars and factories. He is pushing Toyota to reduce the number of components it uses in a typical vehicle by half -- a radical idea that would usher in a new chapter in car design. He also wants to create new fast and flexible plants to assemble these simplified cars.


His ultimate aim: Cut at least a trillion yen ($8.68 billion) in vehicle costs in the next three to four years -- the equivalent of about $1,000 a vehicle -- and keep slashing costs at similar rates thereafter. That is on top of one trillion yen Toyota squeezed out of its parts purchasing from 2000 through 2004, an effort led by Mr. Watanabe in an earlier role. By comparison, GM recently lopped a similar amount from its annual costs, but largely by cutting jobs.

Toyota is gaining market share and racking up profits even as its U.S. rivals are in an historic tailspin. Toyota now has 12% of the world-wide car market, including sales from two affiliates, putting it in the No. 2 spot behind GM. It is poised to soon overtake the embattled Detroit auto maker. Mr. Watanabe's formula of relentless improvement, characterized by a series of programs with lengthy acronyms, helps explain why the Japanese company has been able to prosper as American giants wither.

Like most senior Toyota executives, Mr. Watanabe is careful to downplay the company's ambitions in public. His favorite words include jimichi (steady), tetteiteki (thorough), and, especially, guchoku (having an open mind). If it succeeds, Toyota would further pressure Detroit to revamp itself; failure, however, could slow the Japanese company's seemingly inexorable rise....


For link to rest of article, click on post title.

Monday, December 04, 2006

Thinking About Risk

I read the following article while waiting (too long) at the doctor's last week. It added some useful insight to my knowledge of the subject.

In my consulting practice, I had many occasions to bring up the subject of active risk management. It is of increasing importance in the global automotive industry as the future becomes even more uncertain. Many of those with whom I discussed this matter preferred to throw up their hands at perceived risk, rather than attempting to understand and master it. In addition, there was a severe bias against understanding and quantifying (to the extent possible) the risk associated with doing nothing (by assuming that the current strategy is risk free, in effect) saying that this was the "conservative" approach.

Often continuing the status quo is the least conservative and highest risk approach. On the other hand, sometimes it is very much the right thing. Rational tools exist which will illuminate preferable paths. But, as the following article makes clear, the psychology of risk overcomes rational behavior.

I assume that this is true in the public policy arena as well. Take US policy in Iraq. In 2003 the Bush administration assumed that action was better than inaction. However, it never realistically assesed the risks of action and never developed a robust plan for active risk management. Just look where that got us.


Sunday, Nov. 26, 2006, Time Magazine
Why We Worry About The Things We Shouldn't... ...And Ignore The Things We Should
By JEFFREY KLUGER

Correction Appended: November 27, 2006

It would be a lot easier to enjoy your life if there weren't so many things trying to kill you every day. The problems start even before you're fully awake. There's the fall out of bed that kills 600 Americans each year. There's the early-morning heart attack, which is 40% more common than those that strike later in the day. There's the fatal plunge down the stairs, the bite of sausage that gets lodged in your throat, the tumble on the slippery sidewalk as you leave the house, the high-speed automotive pinball game that is your daily commute.

Other dangers stalk you all day long. Will a cabbie's brakes fail when you're in the crosswalk? Will you have a violent reaction to bad food? And what about the risks you carry with you all your life? The father and grandfather who died of coronaries in their 50s probably passed the same cardiac weakness on to you. The tendency to take chances on the highway that has twice landed you in traffic court could just as easily land you in the morgue.

Shadowed by peril as we are, you would think we'd get pretty good at distinguishing the risks likeliest to do us in from the ones that are statistical long shots. But you would be wrong. We agonize over avian flu, which to date has killed precisely no one in the U.S., but have to be cajoled into getting vaccinated for the common flu, which contributes to the deaths of 36,000 Americans each year. We wring our hands over the mad cow pathogen that might be (but almost certainly isn't) in our hamburger and worry far less about the cholesterol that contributes to the heart disease that kills 700,000 of us annually.

We pride ourselves on being the only species that understands the concept of risk, yet we have a confounding habit of worrying about mere possibilities while ignoring probabilities, building barricades against perceived dangers while leaving ourselves exposed to real ones. Six Muslims traveling from a religious conference were thrown off a plane last week in Minneapolis, Minn., even as unscreened cargo continues to stream into ports on both coasts. Shoppers still look askance at a bag of spinach for fear of E. coli bacteria while filling their carts with fat-sodden French fries and salt-crusted nachos. We put filters on faucets, install air ionizers in our homes and lather ourselves with antibacterial soap. "We used to measure contaminants down to the parts per million," says Dan McGinn, a former Capitol Hill staff member and now a private risk consultant. "Now it's parts per billion."

At the same time, 20% of all adults still smoke; nearly 20% of drivers and more than 30% of backseat passengers don't use seat belts; two-thirds of us are overweight or obese. We dash across the street against the light and build our homes in hurricane-prone areas--and when they're demolished by a storm, we rebuild in the same spot. Sensible calculation of real-world risks is a multidimensional math problem that sometimes seems entirely beyond us. And while it may be true that it's something we'll never do exceptionally well, it's almost certainly something we can learn to do better.

AN OLD BRAIN IN A NEW WORLD

Part of the problem we have with evaluating risk, scientists say, is that we're moving through the modern world with what is, in many respects, a prehistoric brain. We may think we've grown accustomed to living in a predator-free environment in which most of the dangers of the wild have been driven away or fenced off, but our central nervous system--evolving at a glacial pace--hasn't got the message.

To probe the risk-assessment mechanisms of the human mind, Joseph LeDoux, a professor of neuroscience at New York University and the author of The Emotional Brain, studies fear pathways in laboratory animals. He explains that the jumpiest part of the brain--of mouse and man--is the amygdala, a primitive, almond-shaped clump of tissue that sits just above the brainstem. When you spot potential danger--a stick in the grass that may be a snake, a shadow around a corner that could be a mugger--it's the amygdala that reacts the most dramatically, triggering the fight-or-flight reaction that pumps adrenaline and other hormones into your bloodstream.

It's not until a fraction of a second later that the higher regions of the brain get the signal and begin to sort out whether the danger is real. But that fraction of a second causes us to experience the fear far more vividly than we do the rational response--an advantage that doesn't disappear with time. The brain is wired in such a way that nerve signals travel more readily from the amygdala to the upper regions than from the upper regions back down. Setting off your internal alarm is quite easy, but shutting it down takes some doing.

"There are two systems for analyzing risk: an automatic, intuitive system and a more thoughtful analysis," says Paul Slovic, professor of psychology at the University of Oregon. "Our perception of risk lives largely in our feelings, so most of the time we're operating on system No. 1."

There's clearly an evolutionary advantage to this natural timorousness. If we're mindful of real dangers and flee when they arise, we're more likely to live long enough to pass on our genes. But evolutionary rewards also come to those who stand and fight, those willing to take risks--and even suffer injury--in pursuit of prey or a mate. Our ancestors hunted mastodons and stampeded buffalo, risking getting trampled for the possible payoff of meat and pelt. Males advertised their reproductive fitness by fighting other males, willingly engaging in a contest that could mean death for one and offspring for the other.

These two impulses--to engage danger or run from it--are constantly at war and have left us with a well-tuned ability to evaluate the costs and payoffs of short-term risk, say Slovic and others. That, however, is not the kind we tend to face in contemporary society, where threats don't necessarily spring from behind a bush. They're much more likely to come to us in the form of rumors or news broadcasts or an escalation of the federal terrorism-threat level from orange to red. It's when the risk and the consequences of our response unfold more slowly, experts say, that our analytic system kicks in. This gives us plenty of opportunity to overthink--or underthink--the problem, and this is where we start to bollix things up.

WHY WE GUESS WRONG

Which risks get excessive attention and which get overlooked depends on a hierarchy of factors. Perhaps the most important is dread. For most creatures, all death is created pretty much equal. Whether you're eaten by a lion or drowned in a river, your time on the savanna is over. That's not the way humans see things. The more pain or suffering something causes, the more we tend to fear it; the cleaner or at least quicker the death, the less it troubles us. "We dread anything that poses a greater risk for cancer more than the things that injure us in a traditional way, like an auto crash," says Slovic. "That's the dread factor." In other words, the more we dread, the more anxious we get, and the more anxious we get, the less precisely we calculate the odds of the thing actually happening. "It's called probability neglect," says Cass Sunstein, a University of Chicago professor of law specializing in risk regulation.

The same is true for, say, AIDS, which takes you slowly, compared with a heart attack, which can kill you in seconds, despite the fact that heart disease claims nearly 50 times as many Americans than AIDS each year. We also dread catastrophic risks, those that cause the deaths of a lot of people in a single stroke, as opposed to those that kill in a chronic, distributed way. "Terrorism lends itself to excessive reactions because it's vivid and there's an available incident," says Sunstein. "Compare that to climate change, which is gradual and abstract."

Unfamiliar threats are similarly scarier than familiar ones. The next E. coli outbreak is unlikely to shake you up as much as the previous one, and any that follow will trouble you even less. In some respects, this is a good thing, particularly if the initial reaction was excessive. But it's also unavoidable given our tendency to habituate to any unpleasant stimulus, from pain and sorrow to a persistent car alarm.

The problem with habituation is that it can also lead us to go to the other extreme, worrying not too much but too little. Sept. 11 and Hurricane Katrina brought calls to build impregnable walls against such tragedies ever occurring again. But despite the vows, both New Orleans and the nation's security apparatus remain dangerously leaky. "People call these crises wake-up calls," says Dr. Irwin Redlener, associate dean of the Mailman School of Public Health at Columbia University and director of the National Center for Disaster Preparedness. "But they're more like snooze alarms. We get agitated for a while, and then we don't follow through."

THE COMFORT OF CONTROL

We similarly misjudge risk if we feel we have some control over it, even if it's an illusory sense. The decision to drive instead of fly is the most commonly cited example, probably because it's such a good one. Behind the wheel, we're in charge; in the passenger seat of a crowded airline, we might as well be cargo. So white-knuckle flyers routinely choose the car, heedless of the fact that at most a few hundred people die in U.S. commercial airline crashes in a year, compared with 44,000 killed in motor-vehicle wrecks. The most white-knuckle time of all was post--Sept. 11, when even confident flyers took to the roads. Not surprisingly, from October through December 2001 there were 1,000 more highway fatalities than in the same period the year before, in part because there were simply more cars around. "It was called the '9/11 effect.' It produced a third again as many fatalities as the terrorist attacks," says David Ropeik, an independent risk consultant and a former annual instructor at the Harvard School of Public Health.

Then too there's what Ropeik and others call "optimism bias," the thing that makes us glower when we see someone driving erratically while talking on a cell phone, even if we've done the very same thing, perhaps on the very same day. We tell ourselves we're different, because our call was shorter or our business was urgent or we were able to pay attention to the road even as we talked. What optimism bias comes down to, however, is the convenient belief that risks that apply to other people don't apply to us.

Finally, and for many of us irresistibly, there's the irrational way we react to risky behavior that also confers some benefit. It would be a lot easier to acknowledge the perils of smoking cigarettes or eating too much ice cream if they weren't such pleasures. Drinking too much confers certain benefits too, as do risky sex, recreational drugs and uncounted other indulgences. This is especially true since, in most cases, the gratification is immediate and the penalty, if it comes at all, comes later. With enough time and enough temptation, we can talk ourselves into ignoring almost any long-term costs. "These things are fun or hip, even if they can be lethal," says Ropeik. "And that pleasure is a benefit we weigh."

If these reactions are true for all of us--and they are--then you might think that all of us would react to risk in the same way. But that's clearly not the case. Some people enjoy roller coasters; others won't go near them. Some skydive; others can't imagine it. Not only are thrill seekers not put off by risk, but they're drawn to it, seduced by the mortal frisson that would leave many of us cold. "There's an internal thermostat that seems to control this," says risk expert John Adams of University College London. "That set point varies from person to person and circumstance to circumstance."

No one knows how such a set point gets calibrated, but evidence suggests that it is a mix of genetic and environmental variables. In a study at the University of Delaware in 2000, researchers used personality surveys to evaluate the risk-taking behavior of 260 college students and correlated it with existing research on the brain and blood chemistry of people with thrill-seeking personalities or certain emotional disorders. Their findings support the estimate that about 40% of the high-thrill temperament is learned and 60% inherited, with telltale differences in such relevant brain chemicals as serotonin, which helps inhibit impulsive behavior and may be in short supply in people with high-wire personalities.

CAN WE DO BETTER?

Given these idiosyncratic reactions, is it possible to have a rational response to risk? If we can't agree on whether something is dangerous or not or, if it is, whether it's a risk worth taking, how can we come up with policies that keep all of us reasonably safe?

One way to start would to be to look at the numbers. Anyone can agree that a 1-in-1 million risk is better than 1 in 10, and 1 in 10 is better than 50-50. But things are almost always more complicated than that, a fact that corporations, politicians and other folks with agendas to push often deftly exploit.

Take the lure of the comforting percentage. In one study, Slovic found that people were more likely to approve of airline safety-equipment purchases if they were told that it could "potentially save 98% of 150 people" than if they were told it could "potentially save 150 people." On its face this reaction makes no sense, since 98% of 150 people is only 147. But there was something about the specificity of the number that the respondents found appealing. "Experts tend to use very analytic, mathematical tools to calculate risk," Slovic says. "The public tends to go more on their feelings."

There's also the art of the flawed comparison. Officials are fond of reassuring the public that they run a greater risk from, for example, drowning in the bathtub, which kills 320 Americans a year, than from a new peril like mad cow disease, which has so far killed no one in the U.S. That's pretty reassuring--and very misleading. The fact is that anyone over 6 and under 80--which is to say, the overwhelming majority of the U.S. population--faces almost no risk of perishing in the tub. For most of us, the apples of drowning and the oranges of mad cow disease don't line up in any useful way.

But such statistical straw men get trotted out all the time. People defending the safety of pesticides and other toxins often argue that you stand a greater risk of being hit by a falling airplane (about 1 in 250,000 over the course of your entire life) than you do of being harmed by this or that contaminant. If you live near an airport, however, the risk of getting beaned is about 1 in 10,000. Two very different probabilities are being conflated into one flawed forecast. "My favorite is the one that says you stand a greater risk from dying while skydiving than you do from some pesticide," says Susan Egan Keane of the Natural Resources Defense Council. "Well, I don't skydive, so my risk is zero."

Risk figures can be twisted in more disastrous ways too. Last year's political best seller, The One Percent Doctrine, by journalist Ron Suskind, pleased or enraged you, depending on how you felt about war in Iraq, but it hit risk analysts where they live. The title of the book is drawn from a White House determination that if the risk of a terrorist attack in the U.S. was even 1%, it would be treated as if it were a 100% certainty. Critics of Administration policy argue that that 1% possibility was never properly balanced against the 100% certainty of the tens of thousands of casualties that would accompany a war. That's a position that may be easier to take in 2006, with Baghdad in flames and the war grinding on, but it's still true that a 1% danger that something will happen is the same as a 99% likelihood that it won't.

REAL AND PERCEIVED RISK

It's not impossible for us to become sharper risk handicappers. For one thing, we can take the time to learn more about the real odds. Baruch Fischhoff, professor of social and decision sciences at Carnegie Mellon University, recently asked a panel of 20 communications and finance experts what they thought the likelihood of human-to-human transmission of avian flu would be in the next three years. They put the figure at 60%. He then asked a panel of 20 medical experts the same question. Their answer: 10%. "There's reason to be critical of experts," Fischhoff says, "but not to replace their judgment with laypeople's opinions."

The government must also play a role in this, finding ways to frame warnings so that people understand them. John Graham, formerly the administrator of the federal Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, says risk analysts suffer no end of headaches trying to get Americans to understand that while nuclear power plants do pose dangers, the more imminent peril to both people and the planet comes from the toxins produced by coal-fired plants. Similarly, pollutants in fish can be dangerous, but for most people--with the possible exception of small children and women of childbearing age--the cardiac benefits of fish easily outweigh the risks. "If you can get people to compare," he says, "then you're in a situation where you can get them to make reasoned choices."

Just as important is to remember to pay proper mind to the dangers that, as the risk experts put it, are hiding in plain sight. Most people no longer doubt that global warming is happening, yet we live and work in air-conditioned buildings and drive gas-guzzling cars. Most people would be far likelier to participate in a protest at a nuclear power plant than at a tobacco company, but it's smoking, not nukes, that kills an average of 1,200 Americans every single day.

We can do better, however, and leaders in government and industry can help. The residual parts of our primitive brains may not give us any choice beyond fighting or fleeing. But the higher reasoning we've developed over millions of years gives us far greater--and far more nuanced--options. Officials who provide hard, honest numbers and a citizenry that takes the time to understand them would not only mean a smarter nation, but a safer one. [This article contains a complex diagram. Please see hardcopy or pdf.] TOTAL ANNUAL DEATHS 2.5 MILLION Homicide 17,732 Suicide 31,484

Terrified of bees, snakes and swimming pools? ACCIDENTS 109,277 Maybe you should worry more about your heart DISEASES 2.3 million Other diseases 681,150 Diabetes 74,219 Chronic lower-respiratory disease 126,382 Stroke 157,689 Cancer 556,902 Heart disease 685,089 All other deaths 8,364 Sources: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; National Transportation Safety Board

Correction: The original version of this story incorrectly identified David Ropeik as a "former professor at the Harvard School of Public Health." In fact, Mr. Ropeik was a former annual instructor, not a professor, and he was not a member of the school's faculty.
With reporting by With reporting by David Bjerklie/New York, Dan Cray/Los Angeles

Friday, November 24, 2006

"Servi-Manufacturers"

I had never heard the term "servi-manufacturers" before reading this article, but have been lobbying for this concept for many years with my auto supplier clients. Some automakers and many good dealerships have recognized the value of this as well. Good advice for most industries, I suspect. Some times one can get premium price for this approach, but more often customer loyalty is the real payoff. Thus, caring about the long-term is an essential element of a "servi-manufacturer" strategy.


Dawn of steel's flexible future

By Peter Marsh

Published: November 24 2006 02:00 | Last updated: November 24 2006 02:00 Financial Times

When Chiang Yao-Chung says "we have to become better at service", he is talking not only about China Steel, theTaiwanese steelmaker he chairs, but about all its competitors, too.

According to Mr Chiang, steelmakers can no longer simply produce steel; they need to back up their production with services such as design, distribution and "tailoring" of products to meet their customers' more demanding requirements.

Mr Chiang ought to know. Until about a year ago, he was the chairman of China Airlines, Taiwan's largest carrier and an archetypal service business. His comments resonate clearly in the steel industry, where many companies are recognising the need to compete by adding a service element to their production skills.

The new thinking reflects broader changes in manufacturing. In the past 20 years, it has become far more common to find "hybrid" businesses or "servi-manufacturers" that offer customers a more profitable combination of products and services.

Large manufacturers such as Germany's Siemens increasingly provide "service offerings" such as equipment maintenance, but the practice is also being adopted by smaller concerns. Munters, a Swedish maker of dehumidifying equipment, offers to run its machines on a customer's premises where, for example, the business has suffered a flood.

In the steel industry, moves towards adding service most often involve refinements to ordering and production processes, sometimes with a design element.

Even companies widely regarded as makers of "commodity" steel sold at standard prices can see the benefits of adding service operations. At the Polish arm of Mittal Steel, the world's largest steel business, managers are trying to alter the way they sell steel to customers to emphasise smaller production runs and pay closer attention to specifying particular steel grades.

"In the past, we tended to sell steel in lot sizes of hundreds of tonnes at a time," says Sanjay Samadder, sales director of Mittal's Polish subsidiary. "Now the emphasis is on accepting a more complex mix of orders so we can supply steel to customers in a wider range of product grades and in batches of as little as 50 tonnes."

A similar approach is apparent at a large plant in Scunthorpe, northern England, run by Corus - the Anglo-Dutch steelmaker subject to an agreed £5.1bn takeover deal by India's Tata Steel (though a rival, CSN of Brazil, may yet put in a higher offer). One reason Tata wants to buy Corus is to gain expertise in making steel in small batches geared to customers' needs.

Engineers at the Scunthorpe plant are adept at changing the shapes, sizes and chemical formulations of products such as rods and sections through sophisticated procedures to control the dozens of separate steps in steelmaking. In this way they can add tens of thousands of variants to basic steel to meet the requirements of customers.

Another group of steel companies concentrates on making specialist steel grades - a sector where competition is quite limited. In these plants very little "basic" steel, such as commodity coils and bars, is produced. An example is Böhler Uddeholm, the world's largest maker of high-grade steel used in production tooling.

The Vienna-based company says it makes hundreds of different grades of steel for toolmaking. It delivers these in quantities that, by the normal standards of the steel industry, are extremely small - an average of 70kg at a time.

"We sell to 100,000 customers and in many ways are more like a pharmacist than a steelmaker: we have toget our material to customers at the right time andin the right formulation," says Claus Raidl, chiefexecutive.

Furthest down the road of "servi-manufacturers" are businesses that behave more like engineering manufacturers than steel producers. The distinctive feature they offer is expertise in design.

Take Voestalpine. The Austrian steelmaker is a leader in the coated steel sheet used by vehicle companies for the exteriors of car bodies, but the company has gone further, by making "laser-welded blanks".

Voestalpine makes these by welding together two or more pieces of steel into a new sheet, which is then stamped into a part, as specified by a customer, and using its own design and development skills - sometimes in collaboration with the customer.

One of its customers for laser-welded blanks - which sell for $800-$1,000 a tonne, twice as much as conventional steel sheet - is BMW. The German carmaker uses the blanks in some of its car doors, where different grades of steel are needed to help withstand corrosion from rain water.

Two other steelmakers - Rautaruukki of Finland and Bluescope of Australia - have also hit on the idea of turning parts of their businesses into producers of specialised panels and other components.

Both make roofs and gutters used in construction. Rather than sell steel to construction businesses that fabricate the items themselves, Rautaruukki and Bluescope not only turn out the parts in different shapes and sizes but also take on the project management of the building contract.

"In some instances of work we do for customers in construction steel, only 20 per cent [of the contract price] is accounted for by the material cost. The rest comes from what we are providing through design, intellectual property and management expertise," says Sakari Tamminen, chief executive of Rautaruukki.

If "servi-manufacturing" turns out to be an important part of global industry during the next 20 years, then the steel business will have played a big part in showing others how to do it.

Monday, October 30, 2006

Trust but Verify; Verify before Trusting




Trust is a delicate flower. As I told my sons some years ago, if is hard to achieve and easy to ruin. The article below summarizes neatly while I have long believed that the best approach was, to use President Reagan's phrase, "trust but verify".

The diagram above shows some of variables which have to be managed in a trusting business relationship. It illustrates just how delicate are trust and commitment building and maintenance.

We can apply this model to current political behavior and the electorate's reactions. We'll see how this works out a week from now.

My past work in the automotive industry, particularly that involving automaker-supplier relationships validates this thought process. Little wonder that suppliers are more trusting of Toyota and Honda than any of the Big 3. Toyota and Honda behave in a trust-worthy way. Over the past fifteen years, the Big 3 have not. The purchasing heads of the Big 3 say that they want to improve relationships with their key suppliers. Little wonder that supplier executives are sceptical, given their experience. They would be foolish not to "Verify before Trusting".




The Decline Of Trust

By Sebastian Mallaby
Monday, October 30, 2006; A17

In 1995 Francis Fukuyama came out with a book called "Trust," in which he argued that a society's capacity for cooperation underpins its prosperity. The same year, Robert Putnam's famous article, "Bowling Alone," lamented that the United States was depleting its stock of precious social capital. The question of trust -- in government and also in communities -- preoccupied politicians too. "It Takes a Village," Hillary Rodham Clinton urged in the title of her 1996 book, which became a best seller.

You don't hear much about trust these days. Instead, we want accountability.

You see this most viciously in politics. In the mid-term campaigns, nobody has time for trust. The name of the game is to hold opponents accountable by attacking their records -- for failings real or imagined. If the Democrats capture one or both chambers, it will be largely because they promise to hold the president accountable.

This reflects a shift somewhere around 2003 or 2004. In the 1990s, after academics and pundits began talking about trust, the nation did actually become more trusting. The share of Americans saying they trust government "most of the time" or "just about always" rose from 21 percent in 1994 to 56 percent in 2002. Equally, elections became less abrasively focused on accountability. In 2000, according to John Geer of Vanderbilt University, a relatively low 40 percent of the messages in presidential TV spots were negative, down from 47 percent four years earlier.

But some time after the Iraq invasion, these trends reversed. In 2004 the share of Americans saying they trusted government fell to 47 percent, and this month a CBS News-New York Times poll put it at a rock-bottom 28 percent. Meanwhile Geer's measures show that in the 2004 election negative messages jumped to 50 percent of the total, and he guesses that this year's congressional races are the most negative in history.

There's been a similar change in corporate America. In the late 1990s, the new thing for corporate managers was to trust ordinary employees. Company hierarchies were flattened so that people in the middle could demonstrate initiative rather than suffocating under bureaucratic controls. In 1999, the Harvard Business Review reported that 30,000 articles on trusting and empowering middle managers had appeared in the business press over the previous four years.

That paradigm ended in 2002 with Enron, WorldCom and dozens of lesser corporate scandals. Suddenly nobody wanted to trust managers; they wanted to audit them. Instead of the era of management empowerment, we entered the era of mandatory online ethics training. Meanwhile private-equity firms are raising record sums to take over companies on the premise that incumbent managers need to be kicked rather than trusted.

What to make of this shift? Holding people accountable is a good thing:

This season's negative campaigning

can be seen (admittedly, with many despicable exceptions) as a healthy reaction to poor congressional performance. Equally, the 2002 scandals justified the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms of corporate governance. There are reasons we hold teachers accountable for failing

schools and put travelers through metal detectors.

But trust, when not abused, is nonetheless an asset. Accountants, lawyers and online training sessions impose costs on businesses; it would be cheaper to trust people if that were possible. Likewise, as Marc Hetherington of Vanderbilt University has demonstrated, government is constrained if nobody trusts it. The Great Society programs were possible because Americans trusted government in the 1960s; the creation of the Medicare prescription drug program arguably reflected the peaking of trust in government in 2003. But Bill Clinton's health care reform was thwarted in the low-trust early 1990s, and nobody now trusts government to modernize entitlements. Meanwhile President Bush had enormous foreign policy momentum in 2002-03 because Americans trusted him. Thanks to the Iraq mess, Americans are now focused on holding Bush accountable, and his options are limited.

There are powerful reasons trust tends to decline and accountability advances. Mobile societies tend to have weak bonds; the Internet makes it easier to hold people accountable and encourages acerbic negativity. And the absence of trust can feed on itself. Leaders function under stifling oversight; this causes them to perform sluggishly, so trust continues to stagnate. But occasionally there is a chance to escape this trap: A shock causes trust to rise, leaders have a chance to lead and there's an opportunity to boost trust still further.

We've recently had a double opportunity. The boom of the 1990s boosted trust in business; the 2001 terrorist attacks boosted trust in government. But CEOs and politicians abused these gifts with scandals and incompetence. Such is the cost of corporate malfeasance and the Iraq war: Precious social capital is destroyed by leaders' avarice and hubris.

mallabys@washpost.com

Sunday, October 29, 2006

For Carlos Ghosn,, Fast Lane Gets Bumpy


Carlos Ghosn is one of my favorite business leaders. He is not afraid of oversized challenges and certainly faces them at present at both of his jobs as CEO of both Renault and Nissan. I'm glad (and maybe he is too) that the discussions with GM aborted. He has plenty to do without another distraction at present. (He may be right that eventually his alliance needs a North American partner, but this, as he readily admits, is hardly the ideal time.


One of Ghosn's strength is to meld "threat" with "promise". He is a big believer that constant new product introduction is essential for a successful automaker. He understands that a robust cash flow is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for timely new product introductions. He sells continuous and sometimes radical cost reduction as a necessary element for assuring healthy cash flow, hence new product possibilities. This marriage of "carrot" and "stick" has been essential in the past for both Renault and Nissan, particularly effective at the latter.


Hopefully, approaches like this will continue to allow Ghosn to lead both companies to new heights, despite the "bumpy road" described below.



Inside the auto chief's hyperefficient world
of hands-on managing. Can it really save the industry?
Cuing up Fatboy Slim
By MONICA LANGLEY
October 28, 2006; Page A1

MAUBEUGE, France -- Stalking the factory floor of Renault SA's plant here last month, Chief Executive Officer Carlos Ghosn reminded managers of the car maker's commitment to boost its profit margin by 50% by 2009.

"Commitment is a strong word," one manager piped up, "and circumstances have changed" since the marching orders were delivered earlier this year.

"It's not a target," snapped Mr. Ghosn, who considers the profit-margin increase mandatory. "Either management performs or it's out -- and that applies to me as well."

Mr. Ghosn's accept-no-excuses attitude, his tendency to insert himself into the smallest aspects of his business and his celebrated turnaround of Tokyo-based Nissan Motor Co. have made him the closest thing the auto industry has to a rock star. Earlier this week, he was even knighted by Queen Elizabeth for Nissan's contributions to the British economy.

[Carlos <span onclick=Ghosn]" border="0" height="273" hspace="0" vspace="0" width="197">
Carlos Ghosn

In recent months, his name has been floated as a potential savior to the beleaguered U.S. auto industry -- sparking some high-level maneuvering in Detroit. But on the factory floors of France, Mr. Ghosn is under pressure now to show he is more than a one-hit wonder.

Boosting results at Renault, which he took over last year, is proving tough. Although the French company turns a profit, its model lineup is aging and profit has been sliding. In Japan, Nissan, which Mr. Ghosn continues to run, said Wednesday that second-quarter vehicle sales dropped 7.6%. In addition, several weeks ago, Mr. Ghosn's bid to form an alliance with General Motors Corp. fizzled.

"People are wondering if the magic is gone," Mr. Ghosn concedes in an interview.

The hard-charging, 52-year-old executive shot to fame a few years ago by rescuing Nissan from near collapse and giving it one of the highest profit margins among global car makers. Last year he added a second job seven time zones away: chief executive of Paris-based Renault, which has an alliance with Nissan. Each company holds a stake in the other.

Mr. Ghosn's name still looms large in Detroit despite the failed GM talks. Some believe he will eventually play a central role in the U.S. industry's efforts to figure out a way to compete with the Toyota Motor Corp. juggernaut. Mr. Ghosn (rhymes with phone) contends that the only way to compete effectively with Toyota is through an alliance that spans the globe, and that U.S. car makers cannot wait for a miracle or an earthquake to stop the world's strongest auto company. DaimlerChrysler AG and Ford Motor Co. have put out feelers to him about potentially working with him in the future.

In Detroit, discussions about Mr. Ghosn lead invariably to two questions: Is this the man that U.S. auto makers need to pull them out of their tailspins? And would his style fly in America?

A series of interviews with Mr. Ghosn in France and Japan reveal a controlling, hands-on manager who noses into the details of everything from car designs and advertising campaigns to the wording of management brochures and the cleanliness of factory floors. He surveys hundreds of thousands of employees anonymously to evaluate the quality of his managers.

He even selects the music for his public appearances. His current choice: "Right Here, Right Now," by Fatboy Slim. At some auto shows, the tune blares as he walks down a runway and mounts a small circular stage in a dark pinstriped suit. He likes to address his audience in the round.

"I've never seen an executive whose presence is felt at every level up and down the ranks" like Mr. Ghosn's is, says John Casesa of Casesa Strategic Advisors, a New York auto consulting firm. "He's got the best track record of any CEO in the auto business. But the jury is still out if he can create a great global company."

Kirk Kerkorian, GM's largest individual shareholder, and his adviser Jerome York are fans and were the catalyst for the recent talks about a global alliance. They admire Mr. Ghosn for his straight-talking, results-oriented management style, particularly his willingness to reveal profit and sales targets to the markets -- then to deliver on them. They contend this is precisely the tonic Detroit needs.

Skeptics question whether he pushes to meet his goals at the expense of other long-term objectives such as quality and steady product stream. Although the quality of new Nissan models, as measured by J.D. Power & Associates, climbed above the industry average last year, their long-term reliability was below average, lagging behind GM brands such as Buick and Cadillac.

And in a September report, Bernstein Research said that Renault's stock had been "sustained by expectation," but that "near-term fundamentals are bleak." Mr. Ghosn's sales targets, it said, "look increasingly unrealistic."

For U.S. auto makers looking to expand abroad, Mr. Ghosn's global background is appealing. A Brazilian-born Frenchman of Lebanese parents, Mr. Ghosn is fluent in four languages -- English, French, Portuguese and Arabic. He oversees companies operating in more than 100 countries. If measured together, Renault and Nissan would constitute the world's fourth-largest car maker.

[Speed Bump chart]

As a boy growing up in Porto Velho, Brazil, and in Beirut, Mr. Ghosn recalls, he developed a passion for cars and could distinguish between makes by the sounds of their horns. After earning an engineering degree in Paris, he took a job at Michelin SA, the French tire maker, and rapidly climbed the ranks. In 1996, he was recruited to serve as the No. 2 executive at Renault. His subsequent decision to close a factory provoked widespread protests. The French press dubbed him "le cost killer."

In 1999, Renault invested in near-bankrupt Nissan and dispatched Mr. Ghosn to Tokyo to take charge. He began studying Japanese and, in what he describes as an effort to show respect to his elders, retained Nissan's top Japanese executives to work with his team of Renault veterans.

But he broke from tradition by prescribing tough medicine. He sold off Nissan's ownership stakes in many top suppliers, raising much needed capital, and shut down a factory in Japan. He set an aggressive target to boost world-wide sales by one million vehicles by 2005, and rushed jazzy new designs through the development pipeline. His turnaround plan succeeded, and he became a celebrity in Japan. He was even the hero of a comic book.

In April 2005, Mr. Ghosn also took the helm at Renault. He moved his family back to their Paris home, keeping an apartment in Tokyo. The French company was healthier than some European rivals and was turning a profit. But except for its Megane and Clio models, its vehicle lineup wasn't selling well. Sales were zigzagging and profit margins were sliding. Renault's managers were shooting for a 4% margin, far below the nearly 10% margin at Nissan.

"I want specific objectives -- they can't be too short- or long-term -- that are fundamental, understandable and a stretch to achieve," Mr. Ghosn explains.

Earlier this year, he formally raised the bar. His plan, called Commitment 2009, calls for a 6% profit margin and for expanding world-wide vehicle production by nearly one-third, or 800,000 a year, by 2009. He ordered each department and factory to come up with a plan to meet the objectives. He personally fiddled with the wording of internal brochures and posters promoting the plan, he says, to make his intentions "clear and with no ambiguity." He even helped design the logo for the campaign.

During a visit last month to this French factory, which makes the Kangoo compact van, Mr. Ghosn pressed each department head about how they would contribute to the plan. He roamed the factory floor, surrounded by the factory's top managers, eyeing how tools and parts were arranged, even stopping one worker loading parts into a bin. "You're putting that part in the wrong slot," he said.

At a meeting with union representatives, he pressed them on worker absences. During lunch, he slammed the factory's top managers for the high absentee rate. "We have a 4% rate....Peugot and Toyota factories nearby have 2%," he said. "Does your action plan include getting rid of those not playing by the rules?"

The managers exchanged nervous glances and said they were studying the problem. Mr. Ghosn persisted: "An absent employee penalizes his team. With 14% unemployment in this area, I want those who really want to work....The unions I spoke to today have agreed to help."

On the company's Gulfstream jet back to Paris, Mr. Ghosn worked with a speechwriter on an address he planned to deliver to senior Nissan and Renault executives. Mr. Ghosn slashed adverbs and adjectives, reducing sentences to match his blunt style: subject, verb, object. "I don't want one word that's artificial," he said. He ordered up supporting numbers for the text, noting that numbers are a universal language.

The following day, Mr. Ghosn raced through a series of back-to-back meetings at the company's headquarters overlooking the Seine River. Some executives were allotted just 10 minutes. "With Mr. Ghosn, you don't chitchat," says Dominique Thormann, an executive who has worked at both Renault and Nissan. "When you walk into his office, you're there for a purpose that you've cleared ahead of time. He's in a hurry. He's almost obsessed with time."

Mr. Ghosn had to step up his pace when he agreed to run both auto makers. He receives two paychecks -- $2.1 million at Renault and an undisclosed sum estimated to be at least that much at Nissan. He carries two black briefcases, one for each company, and keeps his diaries and papers separate. His long hours in Japan earned him the nickname 7-Eleven, after the 24-hour convenience-store chain popular there.

In his sparsely decorated Paris office, his nearly spotless desk contains just a few papers and reports. It faces three clocks showing times in Paris, Tokyo and Nashville, Tenn., where he recently relocated Nissan's North American headquarters.

An air of formality permeates the offices of both companies. Everyone from senior executives to his driver calls him Mr. Ghosn -- never Carlos. His top advisers have never been to his home. "I've never been invited," says Patrick Pelata, a top Renault executive. Mr. Ghosn considers it vital to keep his professional and private lives separate.

Nearly every Saturday, he has a standing reservation for lunch with his wife, with whom he plays tournament bridge, and the three of his four children who still live at home. Shopping with his kids, he says, helps him "keep connected in music, fashion, youth." He uses them as a sounding board for whether his cars are hip. He was upset for a long time "because my kids never mentioned a Nissan car," he says. They do now, he adds. Image is important to him. Over the past few years, he has lost 20 pounds and had laser eye surgery to shed his glasses.

Although he remains a habitual micromanager, Mr. Ghosn no longer has time to delve into as many decisions at each company. When Michel Gornet, Renault's manufacturing chief, sought his advice on whether to shut down a plant for an extra couple of days, Mr. Ghosn told him: "This is your problem. I have no time for that." Carlos Tavares, Nissan's strategic-planning head, says he gets only an hour a month alone with Mr. Ghosn, and he sometimes has to cover 15 or more topics.

Nevertheless, Mr. Ghosn still seizes on small matters he deems important. With Renault preparing to introduce a new version of the Scenic, he reviewed storyboards for commercials featuring a baby elephant in the minivan. He groused that the ads didn't highlight an important feature for families. "Show the big trunk," he said. (The commercials now do.)

Improvements have been slow to come at Renault. World-wide vehicle sales are down 3.6% this year through September, and the company's European market share is off by one percentage point to 9.4%. Some industry analysts say it will be difficult for Mr. Ghosn to boost productivity at the company, which is partially owned by the French government, without cutting Renault's work force and closing plants -- a politically risky step in France.

Mr. Ghosn says that he expected the slow start, and that planned new models like a sport-utility vehicle developed with Nissan will boost sales. He predicts that both Renault and Nissan will take off in coming months, with the introduction of new models. Nissan plans to roll out an Altima midsize sedan, a Sentra compact and an Infiniti G-35 luxury sedan.

Mr. Ghosn is deep into the details of his pet project: Nissan's GT-R, a high-performance sports car boasting more than 450 horsepower and all-wheel drive. Mr. Ghosn has directed the company not to play up the vehicle's 180-mile-per-hour top speed. "Speed at the moment isn't very positive," he explained at a recent meeting. He directed the campaign to focus on the car's "unique driving experience."

Rob Schwartz of TBWA\Chiat\Day, who runs Nissan campaigns, recently presented five possible ads, featuring music ranging from John Lennon's "Power to the People" to Richard Wagner, the German composer. Mr. Ghosn singled out a new composition by a little-known band. "I like the bells with the metallic guitar -- precise, strong and unique," he says. Remarks Mr. Schwartz: "I've never talked to a CEO about instrumentation."

When news broke in June that Mr. Ghosn was talking to GM executives about a potential alliance, some industry observers wondered how much more he could take on. "I'd question how many companies even Carlos Ghosn can run," says Amir Anvarzadeh, director of Japan equity sales at KBC Financial Products in London, a Nissan bull. "His big ego helped when it gave him the confidence to do the impossible at Nissan, but at this stage, his ego could be a detriment if he tries to do too much."

The talks were the idea of Mr. Kerkorian and his adviser Mr. York, who was then serving on GM's board. From the start, Mr. Ghosn sensed that GM's chief executive, Rick Wagoner, had no interest in combining forces and that Mr. Wagoner resented Mr. Ghosn's car-czar status. GM executives let it be known that Mr. Wagoner preferred to hunker down to get results rather than work on his public image. After the news broke, some GM executives were taken aback that Mr. Ghosn invited auto reporters to one-on-one meetings in a corner suite at New York's St. Regis Hotel to share his thoughts about the possible tie-up.

Despite the tension, Mr. Ghosn pushed ahead, telling his team they had "nothing to lose." The way Mr. Ghosn saw it, an alliance would allow Renault, Nissan and GM to share costs on purchasing, design and manufacturing, potentially saving his two companies several billion dollars over five years.

Last month, over a dinner of quail eggs, grilled vegetables and steak at his favorite yakitori restaurant, Mr. Ghosn told Simon Sproule, a Nissan vice president: "Now we know the value of a North American partner." He reeled off the advantages of sharing vehicle platforms and combining purchasing. He spoke with admiration of GM's strong position in China.

"I'm in this for the long play," he told Mr. Sproule. He speculated that if talks with GM didn't pan out, Nissan-Renault would join with another Detroit auto maker, because the American companies would continue slipping.

Mr. Ghosn and Mr. Wagoner met last month at the auto show in Paris. Over lunch at Renault headquarters, Mr. Wagoner raised impediments. He argued that a deal would benefit Mr. Ghosn's companies more than GM and would give Nissan-Renault de facto control that would warrant a multibillion dollar payment to GM.

Within a week, Messrs. Wagoner and Ghosn called off the talks, and Mr. York resigned from GM's board. GM's stock dropped and Nissan's shares rose. Nissan investors had worried that an alliance with GM would distract Mr. Ghosn from Nissan's problems. Some Nissan dealers in North America also were concerned that associating with GM would dilute the value of their dealerships. "Ghosn is our rock star," one dealer said. "We don't want to share him."

The failed talks, Mr. Ghosn says, "convinced me of the absolute value" of a three-way alliance with a U.S. auto maker. "Who? When? How? I don't know. But I owe it to my stakeholders to pursue" such a deal after Nissan and Renault "get back their tail winds."

If Mr. Wagoner's turnaround plan for GM falters, Mr. Kerkorian, a fan of Mr. Ghosn, could push forcefully for a revival of the idea. Mr. Ghosn also could steer Nissan-Renault into talks with either Ford or DaimlerChrysler.

Ford Chairman Bill Ford has chatted with Mr. Ghosn as recently as this summer about working together. But talk of an alliance anytime soon is unlikely following the appointment last month of Alan Mulally as Ford's new CEO. Ford announced earlier this week a preliminary third-quarter loss of $5.8 billion.

A few months ago, Dieter Zetsche, DaimlerChrysler's chairman, discussed briefly with Mr. Ghosn the potential for working together, but there have been no further talks, according to people familiar with the situation.

Mr. Ghosn says he isn't actively seeking an alliance with a North American partner -- for now, that is. He says he is focusing on making improvements at Renault and regaining momentum at Nissan. In North America, dealer inventory on Nissan's new Versa compact has shrunken to just seven days -- a good sign -- forcing the company to boost production. It expects to post a double-digit gain in U.S. sales in October, compared with a year ago.

"People will be surprised at the positive news ahead," says Mr. Ghosn. "I'm not spreading myself too thin."

--Joseph B. White contributed to this article.

Write to Monica Langley at monica.langley@wsj.com