European Isolationism?

I had never thought of Europe as isolationist, but the following article provides an interesting argument that this is the case. It also gives some good reasons for Europe to break with this world view (or not). You may recall an earlier post (http://opahervey.blogspot.com/2006/10/american-way-of-strategy.html) where I express concern that unless Europe takes a more unified view of its role in the rest of the world, a new "Concert of Power" (in Michael Lind's words) will be difficult, if not impossible, to evolve. This would likely lead to continued American hegemony, not a great idea in my opinion. Again, food for thought.

Europe must not lose sight of why it still matters

By Mark Mazower

Published: November 29 2006 02:00 | Last updated: November 29 2006 02:00 FT.com

Donald Rumsfeld's infamous distinction between "old" and "new" Europe seems unlikely to live on. But there is a fault line running through Europe right now - one of outlook rather than age - which the recent political earthquake in the US will probably widen unless European policymakers begin paying more attention to it. It is the division between those focused on domestic agendas and internal issues, and those who want Europe to pull its weight in the world.

Europe's introspection goes back a long way - long before last year's voters administered such a drubbing to the misnamed constitution. As historians of 19th-century empire tell us, most Europeans were far less bothered by the world than the world was by them, even in the heyday of imperialism. In the early 1940s, Hitler's "Fortress Europe" was nothing if not a formula for Continental self-sufficiency and so, less crudely, was its more durable successor. The European Economic Community showed its members that they could survive, indeed do better than before, by giving up their overseas colonies and dealing with one another instead. The pell-mell expansion of the past decade, by presenting the European Community/Union with an unprecedented institutional challenge, has intensified this inward-looking mentality and vastly complicated foreign policymaking. The Cyprus question now blights Turkey's accession talks, while the proposed EU partnership with Russia is held hostage by the troubled Polish government. To judge from the Dutch polls and the pre-election struggle under way in France, many Europeans now see globalisation as a threat, despair of ever being able to influence Washington in a more positive direction and want simply to pull up the drawbridge.

This kind of outlook, however, is full of risks. Most of the global challenges confronting Europe remain unaltered by the results of the past weeks and, if anything, US President George W. Bush's electoral humiliation will in-crease pressure on the EU to stand up and be counted. As the Germans and the Finns have already emphasised, the crucial issue is the Middle East. No one can afford to allow the vacuum of policy there to continue. Europe should insist - as it has done, quietly, for some time - on the necessity for a settlement of the Israel/Palestine dispute as a precondition for any successful approach to the region as a whole. A Democrat-controlled Congress may not differ substantially from its predecessor on Israel's unique importance as an ally of the US but, because it will be keener on multilateralism, it will be more open to European input.

There is, in other words, an opportunity for Europe - with its substantial commercial, financial and now military commitment to the region - to do much more to bridge the yawning gulf between Washington and the Arab states. Of course, there are other issues. Dependence on overseas energy and labour is higher in Europe than in the US, yet the Union has not been able to forge a coherent policy either towards Russia or towards Africa and the Maghreb. Inside Europe, voter fatigue is jeopardising the prospect of further accession - the carrot for democratisation throughout eastern Europe in the past 15 years - threatening to destabilise the western Balkans. Bosnia remains a black hole for foreign aid. And should there be trouble this time in Kosovo, the rest of Europe cannot expect the US to bail it out again.

Yet Europe cannot make its views count in the world without institutional reform. At present there is far too little linkage between foreign, trade and energy policymaking within the Commission and, as a result, much of the EU's real power in the world is wasted. Concentrating foreign-policy powers in Javier Solana's hands will be a start; improving co-ordination of all external affairs should be next.

That Europeans should still shy away from a more decisive role abroad is not merely understandable; in a certain sense, it may be praiseworthy. After all, it suggests a consciousness of their own past excesses of power and a mistrust of the missionary use of force. Yet the current introspection so visible across much of the Continent indicates a kind of malaise, an ostrich-like desire to bury one's head and forget the wider world as global forces slip beyond the west's control. After the second world war Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian prime minister, criticised the Europeans for thinking the world's problems were chiefly their concern. He was right, of course, and their new modesty is no bad thing. Yet the world's problems are often Europe's problems, too.

The writer teaches history at Columbia University