Reprinted below is the article from the survey which focuses on France's foreign relations. As you will see, it sees many inconsistencies in what France's leaders say and do and the exigencies of the "real world".
In addition to comments specific to France, the article outlines some of the difficulties I cited in my review of "The American Way of Strategy" (October 18, 2006) http://opahervey.blogspot.com/2006/10/american-way-of-strategy.html. As I pointed out, Michael Lind's formulation of "Concerts of Power" would require the EU to become far more realistic about its responsibilities and the resources it needs to devote to those responsibilities.
That, in turn, requires countries like France to be willing to submerge their delusions of grandeur to the common good. If the Economist is to be believed, "Bonne Chance".
On a related issue, I would like to comment on French Anti-Americanism. I don't personally suffer from it as I am accepted as a rare duck, one who speaks French fluently, understands French history and culture, etc. But I do get into many debates with my French friends on the subject, especially since the Iraq war/debacle, on which we more often agree than not. French Anti-Americanism is, in my opinion, linked to France's peculiar educational system which mixes Marxist philosophy with French arrogance. (This is discussed elsewhere in the Economist survey.) Fortunately, we will survive French attitudes and they will survive us.
Beyond these shores
From The Economist print edition
France's foreign relations need a rethink
AT THE height of the recent Israel-Hizbullah conflict, France found itself at the forefront of world diplomacy for the first time since the start of the war in Iraq. Ministers were dispatched to Beirut, diplomats to America. The phone line buzzed between Jacques Chirac and George Bush. Best of all, the French persuaded the Americans to wait for a ceasefire and a political agreement before sending a multilateral peacekeeping force—an achievement that was hailed in Paris as a victory for French diplomacy.
And then France wobbled. Its initial contribution was a mere 200 soldiers. Only after it was upstaged by Italy's muscular offer of 3,000 troops did it boost its own numbers to 2,000.The episode exposed both the aspirations and the limitations of French diplomacy. France, Lebanon's former colonial administrator, felt gratified to be asked by America and Europe to take a lead. This reaffirmed its status as a world power at a time when it had been struggling to make its voice heard. And it seemed to legitimise its strategic value in the Middle East as an independent-minded alternative to the Anglo-American axis.
Yet France's wavering also betrayed the limits to those ambitions. The French seemed happier to send their men to the negotiating table than to the front line. In fact, France's army was already stretched overseas. Thanks to recent increases, the French defence budget now runs to 1.7% of GDP, according to France's defence ministry, but that is still well below Britain's 2.2%. And France was nervous about committing soldiers to a place that has proved lethal in the past, and in the Islamic world when its own Muslims are restless.
France saved its credibility just in time. But if it wants to retain global influence, it now needs to attend to the weaknesses in two key foreign-policy relationships: its transatlantic ties and Europe. France may still hold sway over the French-speaking world, but that will count for little unless France repairs those two links.
In American eyes, France has still not recovered from the 2003 fall-out over Iraq and Mr Chirac's threat to veto a UN military force. “France can plead all it wants for the Americans not to strike Iran,” says François Heisbourg, of the Foundation for Strategic Research, a think-tank. “But they will not listen, because France has no credibility there.”
At the same time, France's rejection of the European constitution has put matters in Europe on hold too. France has yet to work out what it now wants from Europe, or how it can hope to get it. The French sense this unease: about 60% think that France's role in the world is weakening, according to a poll by TNS-Sofres.nt>
>Last month Mr Sarkozy went to America to launch a charm offensive and tell his hosts it was time to turn the page on Franco-American disagreements. Under a big blue sky in New York, he commemorated the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, decorated the city's police chief and firemen, remembered the victims at a church service and promised that “we haven't forgotten, and we'll never forget.”
There are, broadly, two versions of what needs to be done about Franco-American relations. One, advocated both by the Socialists and by Mr Chirac, argues for sticking to France's neo-Gaullist independence. The other is the Atlanticist solution so prominently displayed by Mr Sarkozy during his recent trip.
The boldest exponents of these two contrasting views are, respectively, Mr Chirac and Mr Sarkozy. Mr Chirac believes in building up Europe to counterbalance American power, and will not contemplate a “relationship of submission” to America; Mr Sarkozy believes it is “unthinkable for Europe to forge its identity in opposition to the United States”. Mr Chirac threatened to veto
Their divergent transatlantic reflexes shape their thinking on Africa and the Middle East too. Mr Chirac has close personal ties to African leaders; Mr Sarkozy wants to sweep aside “the old-time networks”. Mr Chirac does not consider Hizbullah a terrorist organisation; Mr Sarkozy says it is. Mr Chirac calls Iran “an old civilisation, a great country” which should be respected; Mr Sarkozy says it is an “outlaw nation” and that, in dealing with it, “we must leave all options open.” Mr Chirac has traditionally been cool towards Israel; Mr Sarkozy is instinctively sympathetic. “He makes Americans feel comfortable with Frenchmen,” commented Israel Singer, of America's World Jewish Congress, after a private meeting between him and Jewish leaders in New York.
The Socialists, for their part, have been latently anti-American since the 1950s, when the French left was seduced by communism. The Socialist Party campaigned for the European constitution with the slogan “A strong Europe to face up to the USA”. Ségolène Royal talks about the need to counterbalance “the American hyperpower”.
Certainly the Socialists too want to restore trust to the transatlantic link; but they are unsparing in their criticism of Tony Blair toeing the American line over Iraq. After Mr Sarkozy's American jaunt, Laurent Fabius, a former prime minister and candidate for the party's presidential nomination, sneered that the interior minister would be “the future poodle of the America.
One thing is sure: France needs to find a better way to deal with disagreements with America. Mr Sarkozy may be right in saying that the tone of France's opposition to the Iraq war was ill-judged: “It's not appropriate to try to embarrass one's allies.” Any real improvement may have to wait for the departure of the two countries' respective presidents, between whom no love is lost. Mr Sarkozy also has a point when he says that the French in general, who devour American popular culture, are far less anti-American than their elites.
The bigger question is how well France's interest would be served by a strategic Atlanticist shift. Taken to extremes, this would challenge a French diplomatic tradition dating back to the time when Charles de Gaulle pulled France out of NATO's military command in 1966 and American soldiers quit French soil. France may not be listened to in America just now. Yet it seems that loyal friends such as Mr Blair are not always listened to either.
Prickly, independent-minded France may exasperate the Americans at times, but even within the Western alliance it can sometimes be useful to have one power that speaks its mind. Who else was pointing out to America the post-war risks in Iraq, as Mr de Villepin far-sightedly did in his 2003 speech to the le="">UNont>? The Americans may still resent the tone of that admonishment, but they and the British recognise the value of France's credibility in the Arab world—and sometimes draw on it to everybody's benefit. In short, France will have to steer a careful course between rebuilding trust sufficiently to strengthen its influence and retaining its ability to speak out.
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Sarkozy cosied up to Bush |
In the post-war era France's foreign policy has been built around the idea that, as a medium-sized ex-colonial power, it would do best to project its voice and further its ambitions through a Europe created to its design. EU enlargement to 25 members in 2004 put an end to this, shifting Europe's centre of gravity to the east and diluting France's influence. The French referendum result was a belated cry of popular protest: against a Europe France no longer recognised, a project it no longer dominated, an organisation that seemed to be more about free markets than political ambition.
Both the French left and right still agree on the need for a strong political Europe. Even Mr Fabius, who broke ranks with his own party to campaign against the constitution, was protesting against what he saw as an excess of economic liberalism in Europe, not against European integration. Now both the Socialists and Mr Sarkozy want a new slimline treaty that would introduce institutional changes to make the enlarged union work better.
The trouble is that France has not yet devised a foreign-policy framework that would enable it to achieve these ends. As for a mini-treaty, it will struggle to get a document to its liking. Many of the elements that it wants will be firmly resisted not only by the British but also by others, such as the Germans and the Poles. The British would contest, for instance, any French attempt to extend qualified majority voting to areas such as taxation, or to shut the door to Turkish membership, both of which Mr Sarkozy advocates.
That said, France is not condemned to being marginalised in Europe. As Lebanon shows, its military force gives it a pivotal role in foreign affairs in Europe. France will need to invest more in troops and hardware if it is to continue to take part in global policing and make diplomatic use of its military might.
France also needs to work out how to build the alliances in an enlarged Europe that would enable it to press its case. This means reaching out to new members, not snubbing them. Few have forgotten Mr Chirac's dismissal of them as “badly brought up”. And the smaller countries are nervous about Mr Sarkozy's talk of a “big six”—France, Germany, Britain, Spain, Italy and Poland—which he sees as an informal platform for reconciling differences, not unlike the Franco-German axis in an earlier, smaller EU. Mr Sarkozy may argue that the Franco-German compact is passé, but France will have to work closely with Germany to try to maintain some influence in Russia and its regional neighbours.
At heart, the French are sceptical about what Europe can do for them today. They are hostile to Turkish entry. They think that open markets are a menace to French jobs and companies. They talk a lot about the need for Europe to be closer to the people, more open, more visible, more relevant, in order to be loved again. All of which may be right. But what is needed most of all is a big effort by French politicians. For years, they have conveniently blamed Europe for many of the uncomfortable changes that they themselves have introduced. And they have kept on talking extravagantly about French grandeur even as France's voice was waning. The cumulative effect has been to undermine Europe in the eyes of the French electorate.
Where is the politician who explains how French companies have benefited from the opening up of markets in eastern Europe? Where is the politician who has faced up to France's diminished voice, and put forward a plan to strengthen it again? Unless French leaders are prepared to be straight with their voters, they will damage their credibility and their influence—not only abroad but at home too.
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